The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?
Leonard E. Gross"
A man walked into a lawyer's office and inquired about the lawyer's
rates. "$50.00for three questions," replied the lawyer. "Isn'tthat kinda
steep?" asked the man while doling out the $50.00. "Yes," answered the
lawyer. "What's your third question?"

How many personal injury attorneys does it take to change a light bulb?
Three- one to turn the bulb, one to shake him off the ladder, and the
third to sue the ladder company.

The problems with lawyerjokes is that
1. lawyers don't think they'refunny, and,
2. everyone else doesn't think they'rejokes!

I.

INTRODUCTION

Rather than laugh off their low public image, lawyers have become concerned -

or say they have, perhaps overly so

-

about the

public's perception of them. To justify some sort of regulation of
lawyers or the legal profession, judges, lawyers, and scholars frequently rely on the argument that such regulation is necessary to preserve the image of the bar.
For example, courts have upheld certain regulations of lawyer
advertising and solicitation over First Amendment challenges on the
Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.A., S.U.N.Y.,
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ground that it is necessary to protect the image of the lawyer.' Other
courts have disqualified lawyers from handling cases to avoid the
"appearance of impropriety., 2 Attorneys have been denied fees on

the ground that to permit the requested fees would tarnish the image
of the legal profession! Some have argued that cameras should be
taken out of the courtroom in order to safeguard the image of the
legal profession. When courts are confronted with the issue of
whether to create a new cause of action, both proponents and opponents of such a cause of action will frequently invoke the need to protect the image of the lawyer to support their argument. 5 Attorneys
and judges have been disciplined,6 and candidates for the bar have
been denied admission,7 based wholly or partly on the need to persuade the public to think well of lawyers and the legal profession.
In this Article, I will show that image problems of lawyers are
long standing and likely are not subject to being changed by many of
the rules that have been adopted to address the "problem." Lawyers
may have a bad image for reasons entirely unrelated to "unethical
practices." I will discuss how the adversary system may be a cause of
the public's poor image of lawyers. Because legal representation is
often required by individuals involved in highly stressful situations or
conflicts, those represented may become less tolerant of the legal
process, and by extension the lawyers who are involved in that process. Historically, the ability to retain lawyers has been a matter of affordability, so the underprivileged may have resented the power that
lawyers could wield over them. I also will discuss the psychological
I See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995); Texas Against
Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar, 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1356 (E.D. Tex. 1995), aff'd, 100
F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996); Committee of Prof'l Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar
Ass'n v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1114

(1986); see also Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 673 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2 See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 211, 536 A.2d 243,

248 (1988).
See infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Don Hewitt, Pencils, Yes; Camera,No, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at A15.

See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
6

See In re Schiff, No. HP 22/92 (Dep't Disciplinary Comm., First Judicial Dep't,

N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1993) (disciplining a lawyer for harassing female opposing
counsel at a deposition with sexist ad hominem attack; stating: "[P]ublic censure is
the appropriate sanction, because those in the profession must understand that sexual harassment is unacceptable behavior and the public must understand that the
profession abhors such behavior and will not condone it."), reprinted in STEPHEN
GiLLERS, REGULATION

OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHicS

775 (5th ed. 1998).

See In re Widdison, 539 N.W.2d 671, 679 (S.D. 1995) ("Public confidence that
the legal profession, under the supervision of this Court, can keep its affairs in order
must be zealously maintained.").
7
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and cultural causes of public antipathy toward lawyers. The public
may have difficulty reconciling the image of lawyers on television and
in movies with that of their less flashy real life counterparts.8
I will then discuss the rules lawyers have implemented to protect
their image and whether those rules are likely to be effective in light
of the foregoing reasons for the public's view of lawyers. In some instances where image has been used as a basis for regulation, courts
could have reached their decisions by other means. In other cases,
the need for a prophylactic rule might have enabled courts to rely on
an alternate basis for their decisions.
I will analyze the dangers present when the legal profession
seeks to regulate itself to achieve a goal as nebulous as improving its
image. I will demonstrate that the most serious danger posed by lawyers using image as a basis of regulation is that it promotes selfserving regulation by lawyers designed to protect their economic interests - such as advocating restrictions on attorney advertising or
denying people admission to the bar.9 In addition, because image is
so dependent upon the status of the person viewing the conduct, the
determination of whether conduct is causing a negative image may
be too subjective to be regulated. The rules designed to protect the
image of lawyers may mask more serious problems and make them
more difficult to solve. For example, taking cameras out of the
courtroom may make people feel better about lawyers at the expense
of being informed citizens.
Finally, I will discuss the legitimate interests served by regulating
on the basis of image. For example, some court decisions, such as
those in the area ofjudicial discipline, may be legitimately justified by
the need to protect the public's image of the judicial system and not
simply its image of lawyers.
II.

HISTORY OF THE UNPOPULARITY OF LAWYERS

The public's antipathy toward lawyers has a long history. Prior
to the twentieth. century, most of the evidence of this attitude has
been anecdotal. Nevertheless, the long-standing nature of the public's attitude suggests that adopting particular rules relating to lawyers
and the legal profession will have little impact on that attitude.

8 See generally Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607
(1989).
9 See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 74-101 (1976); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral CharacterAs a Professional
Credential 94 YALE L.J. 491, 507-12 (1985).
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Seventeenth to Nineteenth Century America

The tradition of hating lawyers may have been based in part on
jealousy. The wealth of some lawyers certainly was one factor that
engendered jealousy among the common people.'0 Another recurring reason for lawyers' unpopularity has been their representation
of the dominant class in society." By the seventeenth century, transactions were becoming more complex and more legalistic and there
was a greater need for lawyers' services. As the need for lawyers grew,
however, so did the popular concern that lawyers took advantage of
the corruption, expense, and delay in the legal system to help their
clients. 2 Reports abounded of lawyers taking money from both sides
in a transaction. There were also reports of conflicts of interest and
violations of confidences. People also tended to blame their lawyers
for losing cases due to incompetence. In light of the poor legal training of most lawyers of the time, this attitude may very well have been
justified. During the English Civil War period, 1646-1653, public
hostility toward lawyers increased and efforts were made to reduce
their role. "s Some lawyers responded by proposing changes to the
legal system, but more cynical observers believed that such changes
were 1proposed
out of a desire to avoid more sweeping public re4
form.
10

See Wilfrid Prest, The English Bar, 1550-1700, in LAWYERS IN EARLY MODERN

EUROPE AND AMERICA 65, 73 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 1981).

In Medieval England, Sir
Thomas More made the absence of lawyers one of the hallmarks of his Utopia. See
WILLAM SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW 144 (1941). In the Middle Ages, throughout
England and Western Europe, popular hostility to lawyers increased.
See SEAGLE, supra note 10, at 148; see also FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU,
LAWYERS! 225-46 (1939) (discussing why lawyers tend to favor wealthy and conservative interests).
12 See Prest, supra note 10, at 73-74. Prest asserted that because
transactions occurred over greater distances, individuals, particularly merchants, were less able to
rely on the reputation of those with whom they were dealing. See id, at 73. Consequently, it became more necessary for them to retain the services of lawyers who
would protect their interests. See iti He noted that, at the same time, popular mistrust of lawyers increased. People resented the learning of lawyers and mistrusted
them, fearing that lawyers turned knowledge of the arcane legal system to their own
advantage. See id. at 73-74. More than that, people feared that lawyers took advantage of the system in unethical ways to help themselves. See id. at 74.
is See id. at 75. Wilfrid Prest asserted that religious zealots sought to replace
man's law with God's law as written in the Bible. See id. He reasoned that this would
clearly have reduced or eliminated the need for people with traditional legal training. See id. In addition, a spirit of populism arose, which saw lawyers as having conspired with the clergy and nobility to impose a Norman tyranny on the common
peo?le of England. See id
See id. at 75-76. Prest opined that changes may have been proposed out of an
honest desire for reform. See id. at 75. Ultimately, he observed, the goal of reform
and the attack on lawyers faded when propertied interests saw that they would lose
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In colonial America there was even more hostility toward lawyers
than there was in England. 5 Initially, Massachusetts prohibited anyone from accepting a fee for representing a litigant. Not until 1673
was the practice of law formally recognized and, even then, fees were
strictly regulated.' 6 Professor Stephen Botein noted that even when
the practice of law was permitted, very few men chose law as their
profession.' Those who did so often brought more stigma to the
profession through their unsavory acts. 8 There were complaints
against lawyers stirring up frivolous litigation, and there was a general
air of suspicion and mistrust of professional lawyers throughout the
colonies. ' 9
their own standing if the radical reformers prevailed. See id. at 76. Though lawyers
survived the civil war period, their numbers stopped increasing. See id. at 77. Parents did not want to see their sons entering the legal profession. See id. There was
thought to be a glut of lawyers. See id. What glamor people had previously associated with the legal profession had also faded. See id.
15 See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE 197
(1958). Historian Daniel Boorstin wrote that "ancient English prejudice against lawyers secured new strength in America .... [Dlistrust of lawyers became an institution." Id. Much of the law was framed by the clergy without the assistance of lawyers. See Stephen Botein, The Legal Profession in Colonial North America, in LAWYERS IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA, supra note 10, at 129-30. In Puritan Massachusetts Bay Colony, legal reform, which had been largely blocked in England, took
hold. See i&.A unitary court system developed in Massachusetts, with county courts
handling most of the legal business. Many of the arcane quirks of the English legal
system were swept away. Juries decided questions of law and fact. If a colonist was in
need of legal assistance, a friend, relative, or agent could assist him. More skilled
help generally was not needed as many of the matters were relatively simple. See id.
6 See Botein, supra note 15, at 131.
17 See
id.
19 See id. at 131-32. Botein wrote that in the 1620s, one Thomas Morton was
known to "cavort around a maypole with drunken comrades and Indian women."
Id. at 131. Morton insisted on his rights as an Englishman when faced with arrest,
which further irritated people. See id. In the 1630s, Thomas Lechford, an English
Solicitor caused more trouble. See idiHe pled with a jury outside of court. Later
"he made a nuisance of himself" when he criticized the informality of local legal
proceedings. See id. at 131-32.
19 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 97 (2d ed. 1985).
Lawyers were also criticized both for incompetence and for wrongful competence.
See id. In Pennsylvania, the Quakers were keenly aware of the "blackness" that enveloped lawyers and therefore sought to handle all disputes by means of "Gospel order." See id. at 95. They distrusted the adversary system, instead favoring a peaceful
system that contained as few technicalities as possible. See id. For that reason, the
secular courts insisted on "brevity, plainess [sic] and verity, in all declarations and
pleas." Botein, supranote 15, at 132.
In New York the royal governor reported that "'almost all'" lawyers were "men
of 'scandalous character' - one a dancing master, another a convicted blasphemer
who 'mangled' the meanings of 'noble English laws.'" Id. In 1743, there were
only eight attorneys in New York City. See RoscoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQurryTO MODERN TIMES 141 (1953). Between 1695 and 1769 only 41 lawyers practiced in New York City. See CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 96
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By the eighteenth century, the legal profession underwent significant change, as did the public's attitude toward it.20 As procedures became more formal and commercial transactions increasingly
complex, the system became more difficult for poorly trained lawyers
to understand. Consequently, the legal system required better
trained lawyers who could navigate these complexities.2 1 To increase
(1990). According to Chancellor Kent, a good many of these men were "learned
and accomplished." See id. at 97.
In Virginia there was also suspicion and mistrust of professional lawyers. There
was much legislation hostile to lawyers. An act of 1645 recited that unskilled and
covetous attorneys had brought many troublesome lawsuits, and further provided
that all "mercenary attorneys" be "wholly expelled from that office" except for pending matters. See POUND, supra, at 137 (citing Act VII of 1645, 1 Hening, Statutes at
Large of Virginia, 304). That act was repealed in 1656; under the new act, the Governor and Council were to appoint attorneys in the Quarter Courts, with the Commissioners nominating attorneys for the County Courts. See id. (citing Act VI of
1656, 1 Hening, Statutes at Large of Virginia, 418). The act further provided that
"only those be called counsellors at law who have already qualified thereunto by the
laws of England, and those so qualified shall have all the privileges those laws give
them." See id. (citing Act VI of 1656, 1 Hening, Statutes at Large of Virginia, 418). In
1657-58 a statute was adopted to prohibit any attorney or other person from pleading in any court or giving counsel in any "cause or controversy" for any kind of reward or profit. See id, at 138 (citing Act CXII of 1657-58, 1 Hening, Statutes at Large
of Virginia, 482). In 1658 a statute was passed which instructed courts to render
judgment "according as the right of the cause and the matter shall appear unto
them, without regard of any imperfection, default or want of form in any writ, return, plaint or process." Botein, supra note 15, at 133. In 1680 an act was passed
that allowed lawyers to obtain fees, but no one was permitted to practice unless licensed by the Governor. See POUND, supra, at 138 (citing Act VI of 1680, 2 Hening,
Statutes at Large of Virginia, 479). That statute was repealed in 1682, thereby theoretically abolishing the practice of law. See id. (citing 2 Hening, Statutes at Large of
Virginia, 498). However, the practice of law continued, though mostly confined to
larger towns. See id. Further attempts to license legal practitioners in Virginia were
thwarted by local planters who feared that a professional bar would help strengthen
executive authority. See Botein, supra note 15, at 133. In addition, there was the
usual concern that lawyers would bring about excessive litigation. See id. As in New
England, county clerks sought to simplify procedures. See id. Although there were
some English trained lawyers who began to practice around the capitals in Maryland
and to a lesser degree in Virginia, that was the exception. See id. Most of the settlements were small and dispersed, without access to lawyers. See id. Disputes were settled by untrained litigants representing themselves and their neighbors before
judges of the same class; these disputes often degenerated into courtroom brawls.
See id.
20 See Botein, supra note 15, at 134-35. The Crown, with the assistance of the
royal governors, began to centralize the court system. See id. at 134. There was increased formality in the court system. See id. at 135. For example, Chief Judge
Thomas Hutchinson of Massachusetts ordered that judges and lawyers wear appropriate robes and gowns. See id
2 See id. at 134-35. Young men began to see a legal career as a way to increase
both their economic and social standing. See id. at 136. From 1760 to the Revolution, more than 100 Americans studied law in London. See POUND, supra note 19, at
157. Gradually, more American trained lawyers began to replace English trained
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the dignity of the bar and to separate themselves from poorly trained
local practitioners, elite lawyers sought to reform the legal profession
by forming. associations to regulate admission to the bar, to reduce
inefficiency in the courts, and to prevent fee competition.2 By the
middle of the eighteenth century, more lawyers, particularly in the
cities, had at least a fair measure of training.2s
Just below the surface, there was still some public resentment
toward lawyers because, despite these improvements, many lawyers
remained inadequately trained or not trained at all.2 ' The Virginia
Almanac certainly would have appreciated Jim Carrey's portrayal of a
lawyer in the movie Liar,Liar. The Almanac of 1762 stated: "'I know
not ...what distinction there may be in London; but I am sure, by

sad experience, we in the country know no difference between a lawyer and
'
a liar.-s
Although lawyers were among the leaders in the Revolution, many, including John Dickinson of Pennsylvania, the author of
Letters from a Farmerin Pennsylvania,refused to identify themselves as
lawyers when advocating their cause. 6 After the outbreak of the
lawyers. See id. Salaries of lawyers increased as did the social standing of those entering the profession. See Botein, supra note 15, at 135-36.
See Botein, supra note 15, at 136.
23 See id. at 137.
Many lawyers outside the cities still were able to practice law
with only a modicum of training. For example, Patrick Henry obtained a license to
practice law after spending less than six weeks reading Coke on Littleton and the
Statutes at Large See id.
24 See POUND, supra note 19, at 143-44. In 1760,
John Adams wrote in his diary of
the "multitude of pettifoggers ...who stirred up dirty and ridiculous litigation." Id.
(quotingJOHN ADAMS DIARY, 2 WORKS 90-91, June 19, 1760). Adams wrote about one
Kibby, a tavern keeper in Braintree, Massachusetts. Id. On his shelf were two books:
Every Man his Own Lawyer and Gilbert on Evidence. Id. When Adams questioned some
local townspeople, they told him that Kibby was "sort of a lawyer ...he pleaded
some of their home cases before justices, arbitrators, etc." Id. (quoting JOHN ADAMS
DIARY, 2 WORKS 271, June 7, 1771). In New England, lawyers still had to contend
with rivalry from the clergy. Then, after the Great Awakening of the 1740s, old Puritan prejudices began to arise. See Botein, supra note 15, at 138. In Pennsylvania, one
German language newspaper opposed lawyers' attempts to secure elective office by
pointing out that "what is to ... [lawyers'] profit is often to the farmers' loss." Id. at
139. Furthermore, in the backwoods throughout the colonies, though there were
few lawyers, there was a great deal of resentment toward them.
25 Botein, supra note 15,
at 139 (quoting VIRGINIA ALMANAC (Williamsburg
1762)). In the early 18th century, one visitor to Pennsylvania wrote home: "They
have no lawyers. Everyone is to tell his own case, or some friend for him .... Tis a
happy country." KERMrr L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS

305 (2d ed. 1996).

See Botein, supra note 15, at 141. Lawyers were also prominent among those
opposing the Revolution. Many feared the loss of their association with the imperial
establishment. See id.at 141-42. Consequently, even before the Revolution began,
the public image of lawyers had plummeted. In an election in New York, a popular
slogan was, "'no lawyer in the assembly.'" Id. at 142. In North Carolina, citizens
demanded that "'[t]here should be no lawyers in the province, they damned them-
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Revolution, popular attitude toward lawyers declined further. Public
animus toward lawyers was influenced not only by the high percentage of lawyers who were Tories, but also by the perception that lawyers were "instruments of an English system of law."2 7 Following the
Revolution, other forces caused public resentment toward lawyers to
continue. An economic depression followed the end of the Revolution - many saw lawyers as being too aggressive in representing
creditors against debtors. 8 William Duane of Philadelphia, the editor of a Republican newspaper who had previously been acquitted on
a charge of seditious riot in a case growing out of the unpopular
Alien and Sedition Acts, published a widely read pamphlet in 180405.2 Duane's pamphlet reflected the class-based jealousy toward lawyers that was common. In the pamphlet, Duane attacked lawyers,
whom he called "our national aristocracy," for being willing to defend right and wrong indifferently for pay." Duane continued:
A privileged order or class, to whom the administration of justice
is given as a support, first employ their art and influence to gain
legislation; they then manage legislation as never to injure themselves; and they so manage justice as to engross the general property to themselves through the medium of litigation; and the misfortune is, that to be able to effect this point, it is attended by loss
of time, by delay, expense, ill blood, bad habits, lessons of fraud
and temptation to villainy, crimes, punishments, loss of estate,
character and soul, public burden and even loss of national character.

Another factor that caused popular resentment toward lawyers
was the common practice of making matters as unintelligible to laymen as possible. For example, the use of Latin and French phrases
often seemed designed to obfuscate the process and thereby help
selves if there should.'" Id. Likewise, in New Jersey, lawyers were denounced as
",private leaches, sucking out our very hearts blood.'" Id. at 142. By 1775,John Adams argued that the term "British Empire" was the language of "court sycophants."
See id.
27 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 10 (1974). A
New York
statute of 1779 suspended from practice all lawyers who had been practicing before
April 1777. See id. The English doctrine of criminal libel was probably the most
hated aspect of the English common law. Under this doctrine, truth was no defense,
and the jury could only resolve the issues of publication and innuendo. See WARREN,
supra note 19, at 221-22 (citing WILLIAM DUANE, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES OR
THE REFORMATION OF LAWSUITS ANDJUS'nCE MADE CHEAP, SPEEDY AND BROUGHT HOME

TO EVERY MAN'S DOOR AGREEABLE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT TRAL BY JURY
BEFORE THE SAME WAS INNOVATED BYJUDGES AND LAWYERS (1804-1805)).
28 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19, at 303.

SeeWARREN, supra note 19, at 221-22.
30

s1

See id. at 222.
Id.
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continue the lawyers' monopoly over the court system.32 Alexis de
Tocqueville, noted French observer of the American scene in the
early 1800s, remarked that "[t]he French codes are often difficult to
comprehend, but they can be read by everyone; nothing, on the
other hand, can be more obscure and strange to the uninitiated than
a legislation founded upon precedents. "ss
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, popular distrust
of lawyers continued as many American lawyers were sorely lacking in
legal training." Popular culture still depicted the lawyer as a greedy
manipulator who used technicalities to oppress the weak and the ignorantss In 1850, Abraham Lincoln wrote in Notesfor a Law Lecture of
a vague popular belief that "lawyers are necessarily dishonest. "*s He
32

See id. at 222-24.

33 1 ALEXIS DE TOcQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 277 (Bradley
ed.,
34 See MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

1945).
259-60 (1936).
The wave of popular democracy that spread during the Jacksonian period resulted
in attacks on the elite. As a result, judges were frequently elected rather than appointed. Elected judges frequently were less competent than their appointed peers.
The democratic impulses also prevented the establishment of any sort of elite group
of lawyers. See id In 1835, Tocqueville wrote of his visit to America that
there are no nobles or literary men, and the people are apt to mistrust
the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class and
the most cultivated portion of society. They have therefore nothing to
gain by innovation, which adds a conservative interest to their natural
taste for public order.
1 TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 33, at 278.
35 See RADIN, supra note 34, at 251. A story that appeared
in a Nebraska magazine

in 1856 told of an old woman who asked a local lawyer to teach her seven-year- old
son to be a lawyer. Fit for a Lawyer, NEBRASKA ADVENTuRER, Oct. 25, 1856, at 3, reprinted in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAw 94, 94-95 (Charles M. Haar ed., 1965).

The lawyer asked the woman if she had any older sons who might be better qualified
for the legal profession. See id. The woman responded that she did have older sons,
but that she and her husband had concluded that although they too would become
lawyers, her youngest had the makings of a really first-rate lawyer. See id. When the
lawyer asked the woman what her son's particular qualifications were, she responded:
"Why, do you see sir, he is just seven years old to-day. When he was
only five he would lie like the devil; when he got to be six, he was sassy
and impudent as any crittur could be; and now he will steal everything
he can lay his hands on. No if he ain't fit for a lawyer, I would like to
know what he would have to learn?" The lawyer responded: "Pretty
well educated, I should think."
Id.
See Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, 2 COLLECTED WORKS 80 (1953),
reprinted in THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERCAN LAW, supra note 35, at 98. He counseled
36

prospective lawyers that those who choose the legal profession should not yield to
the popular belief that all lawyers are dishonest. See id. He further advised that "if in
your own judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without
being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation, rather than one in the choosing of
which you do, in advance, consent to be a knave." Id.
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added that this "impression is common, almost universal."37 Popular
suspicion of lawyers was fueled partly by defects in the machinery of
the judiciary, which caused the public to believe that lawyers were either knaves or charlatans, or both. One of the defects in the judicial
process for which lawyers were blamed included arbitrary technical
sets of rules which lawyers used to defeat the claims of legitimate
suitors and run up huge costs.3s
In the middle of the nineteenth century, lay distrust of lawyers
was heightened by public distrust of the common law system. 9 These
beliefs led to periodic advocacy of codification of the law as a way to
control judicial discretion.40 In addition, some saw popular election
ofjudges and control over juries as additional devices to prevent encroachment on popular legislative prerogative.' Class conflict also
affected the public's attitude toward lawyers. During downturns in
the economy, debtors frequently blamed lawyers who represented
42
banks, creditors, railroads, and corporations for their troubles.
Twentieth Century America

B.

In a speech to Harvard undergraduates in 1905, Louis D. Brandeis explained why he believed the public had lost confidence in lawyers:
[I]nstead of holding a position of independence, between the
wealthy and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either,
able lawyers have, to a great extent, allowed themselves to become
adjuncts of great corporations and have neglected their obligation
to use their powers for the protection of the people. We hear
much of the "corporation lawyer," and far too little of the people's lawyer. 43
37

Id.

s8 See The American Bar in 1851, 28 DEMOCRATIC REV. 195 (1851), reprinted in THE
GOLDEN AGE OF AMERIcAN LAw, supra note 35, at 107. The article added that the
opinion was not confined to the "vulgar" classes but permeated all elements of society. See id.
See Robert Rantoul, Oration at Scituate (July 4, 1836), in AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 317-18. Many in the public believed that the common law
allowed judges to create ex post facto law according to the judge's own personal
pre uidices. See id. at 318.
See HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 316-17; see also David Dudley Field, What Shall
Be Done with the Practice of the Courts? (1847) (advocating codification of civil procedure in New York state courts), in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 25, at 322.
41 See, e.g., Charles Reemelin, Statements Regarding an Elective Judiciary (July
5,
1850) (delivered at the 1851 Ohio constitutional convention), in AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 326-27.
42 See HALL ET AL., supra note 25, at 252.
4s AUERBACH, supra note 9, at
34-35.
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Brandeis added that lawyers had failed to act in the public interest by
opposing constructive legislation in the public interest while failing
to oppose legislation in behalf of "selfish interests."" In the same
vein, Professor Berle wrote that from 1890-1930, during the growth
of the large corporations, corporate lawyers developed a "singularly
sinister reputation" as little more than45highly paid mercenaries serving the "all-powerful financial tycoons.

With increasing social tensions in society, lawyers became concerned about the declining force of law and the declining stature of
lawyers.46 In 1931, New York lawyer Morris Gisnet wrote of the public's low opinion of the administration of justice and of those con44 See id at 34-35. Similarly, in a speech to the American Bar
Association (ABA)
in 1910, Woodrow Wilson compared the golden age of the past, in which principled
lawyers offered disinterested service to the community, with the then current situation, in which he said, American Society "'has lost something or is losing it.. . .'" See
id. at 34. He remarked that the day's lawyers had
"been sucked into the maelstrom of the new business system of the
country .... They do not practice law. They do not handle the general, miscellaneous interests of society. They are not general counsel-

ors of right and obligation .... [The lawyer] does not play the part he

used to play. He does not do what he ought to do."'
Id. at 34. As counsel to corporations, lawyers applied their skill to destroying "all
that has been going on. The country holds them largely responsible for it. It distrusts every 'corporation lawyer." Id.
45 Adolph A. Berle, Corporation Lawyer ...Saint or Sinner? The
New Role of the Lawyer in Modern Society, 76 HARv. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962) (reviewing BERYL HAROLD LEW,
CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? (1961)).
46 See AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 18.
According to Jerold Auerbach, the class
warfare between lawyers that began in the late 19th century undercut professional
harmony. See id. Immigrant lawyers frequently represented the poor and the underclass while large blue blood law firms more often represented corporations. See
id. at 19. Interestingly, although the public may continue to view lawyers as conservative and representative of the moneyed class, many lawyers represent humanitarian groups and advance "liberal" reform. See id. In fact, one study of lawyers in state
legislatures found that lawyers were not more conservative than non-lawyers. See
HEINZ EuLAu & JOHN D. SPRAGUE, LAWYERS IN PoLTics: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL
CONVERGENCE 26-27 (Robert C. Wood ed., 1964). For example, in a study of the
ideological stance of lawyers in four state legislatures in 1957, lawyers' responses to
survey questions showed them to be somewhat more liberal than their non-lawyer
colleagues:

Id. at 26.

Percent
considering
themselves liberal

New.lersey

Ohio

Tennessee

California

Lawyers

37%

31%

36%

59%

Non-lawyers

32%

24%

20%

40%
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nected to it. He attributed the low public opinion to a number of
factors, including corruption of lawyers, the attempted enforcement
of Prohibition laws, the failure of criminal prosecution in cases involving rich defendants, contingency fees, and lawyers "play[ing] up
the sex element" in high profile cases "for the benefit of the tabloids
and a morbid, sensation-loving public."47
Most public opinion polls conducted over the last fifty years
show that the public has a low opinion of lawyers." Gallup and
Roper polls conducted in 1949 and 1950 showed that the general
public did not believe young people should pursue the legal profession as a career.9 In a 1960 poll of laymen and lawyers conducted by
the Missouri Bar, most people thought that lawyers ranked below
bankers, clergy, doctors, and teachers in "general reputation." Furthermore, only 35% thought that lawyers were honest and truly dedicated to their profession.5 A 1993 survey showed a worsening of the
image of lawyers since 1986."' However, the poll also indicated that
more people than ever were using lawyers, and that they were generally happy with the services they received.
The public's opinion of lawyers had declined still further by
1996. A Florida survey showed that 44% of people had little or no
respect for lawyers, up from 25% in 1988. Lawyers had the dubious
distinction of belonging to the least liked profession. 53 Attorneys
themselves believe that the public has an even worse view of them.
Among New Jersey attorneys, 86.2% believe the public is becoming
more anti-lawyer; only 12.1% believe that the image of lawyers is not
deteriorating and 1.7% have no opinion.' A 1997 Harris survey
47 MORRIS GISNET,ALAWYERTELLS THE TRUTH 20, 22-27
(1931).

Other surveys show that the public believes the legal profession to be a prestigious occupation. See infra note 57. The public's ambivalent attitude toward lawyers
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 57-59, infra.
49 See MURRAYTEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS
332 (1968).
50 See id.
at 332-33.
51 See Randall Samborn, Poll: Image of Lawyers Around Country Grows Worse, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1. Thirty-one percent of the respondents believed lawyers to be
less honest than most people, up from 17% in 1986. Sixty-four percent believed that
lawyers' honesty was "about average," down from 73% in 1986. See id.Furthermore,
while 52% said that lawyers' image had stayed the same, 36% of the respondents said
that lawyers' image had gotten worse over time, while only 8% said that it had improved. See id. Nevertheless, 70% of the respondents reported having personal or
business contact with an attorney in the past five years, up from 52% in 1986. See id.
52

See id.

53 See Peter Wallsten, Commission Aims To Help Lawyers Be More Appealing,
ST.

TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at 10B.
See Rocco Cammarere, How Lawyers See Their Image: From Bad to Worse, N.J.
LAw., Apr. 29, 1996, at 1. Similarly, in England, 64% of lawyers responding to a surPETERSBURG
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showed that the percentage of the public who viewed the law as very
prestigious had dropped from 36% in 1977 to 19% in 1997.' However, a 1998 Harris poll showed lawyers in the middle of the pack,
with 23% of respondents holding lawyers in the highest regard.-"
It should be noted, however, that the public's attitude toward
lawyers has not been uniformly negative. Even the people who say
they resent lawyers may feel a certain ambivalence toward them.
While people may be jealous of lawyers' learning, they may also respect them for it." Clients may appreciate lawyers who have rescued
them yet simultaneously resent them for it.8 Because of this ambivalence toward the rescuer, there have been a great many slurs against
physicians (though not nearly as many as against lawyers)."
In determining whether the public's perception of lawyers creates a problem justifying regulation, what one should look to is not
how people describe their attitude toward lawyers generally, but
whether their behavior in retaining or confiding in a lawyer is negatively affected by their view. Significantly, people's disparaging attitudes toward lawyers in general has not caused them to lose confidence in their own lawyers, according to at least two surveys.6
vey believe that lawyers have a negative public image; 85% think the legal profession
is less respected than it was 20 years ago. See Snapshot of a Profession in Turmoil
LAWYER, May 7, 1996, at 12.
55 See Chris Klein, Poll: Lauryers Not Liked, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6.
See Doctors, Scientists Enjoy Public's Highest Favor, Harris Poll Says, COM. APPEAL

(Memphis),June 17, 1998, at B8.
57

See

ALBERTJ.

REISS ET

AL.,

OCCUPATIONS

AND

SOCIAL STATUS 238 (1961).

In

1947, a study of occupations by prestige rated lawyers rather high. This study found
that when respondents were asked to rate the standing of various occupations, 90%
gave lawyers good or excellent ratings for "pays well," 87% gave favorable ratings for
lawyers' service to humanity, and 92% gave such ratings to lawyers' social prestige.
See id. Overall, 44% of the public gave lawyers an "excellent" rating for prestige in
March of 1947. By June of 1963, 53% of the public gave lawyers an "excellent" rating and 38% gave them a "good" rating. See Robert W. Hodge et al., Occupational
Prestigein the United States: 1925-1963, 70 AM.J. Soc. 286, 290 tbl.1 (1964-65).
See BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CORPORATIoN LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 4-5
59

See GABRIEL THOMAS, ACCOUNT OF

THE

(1961).

PROVINCE AND COUNTRY OF PENNSYLVANIA

AND OF WEST NEWJERsEY (1698), quoted in LEW, supra note 58, at 4 ("Of lawyers and
physicians I shall say nothing, because this country is very peaceable and healthy.
Long may it so continue, and never have occasion for the tongue of the one nor the
pen of the other, both equally destructive of men's estates and lives.").
See DIVERSIFIED RESEARCH,

INC., SURVEY OF MIDDLE-INCOME NEW YORKERS ON
ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES AND USE OF LEGAL SERVICES 11-12 (Aug. 22, 1995) in NEW
YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO COMMISSION ON PROVIDING ACCESS TO LEGAL
SERVICES FOR MIDDLE INCOME CONSUMERS OF NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

In

a

1995 survey of middle income New Yorkers with annual incomes between $25,000
and $95,000, 32% reported having used an attorney whose services were excellent;
41% reported having had good feelings about the legal services they received; 18%
described the services as fair; and 7% called them poor. See id. Eighty percent of
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Moreover, people are using lawyers more than ever and are generally
happy with their own lawyers. 61 The public's increased willingness to
retain lawyers despite their negative view of the legal profession in
general may be attributable to their expectation that one's own lawyer will be an aggressive advocate, willing to cut red tape and bend
the rules to the client's advantage. 62 The lesser educated seem to
have even more confidence in their lawyers than those who are well
educated.63 There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, when poorer individuals obtain lawyers, they will do so a
greater percentage of the time on a contingency fee basis and thus
are obligated to pay only when their lawyer is successful. Second,
poorer clients may have lawyers perform more mundane tasks for
which the cost is less and the winner and loser more readily apparent.
It is not all that surprising that people may behave differently in
retaining or confiding in their own lawyer than might be predicted
by their view of the legal profession. There have been many studies
showing that people's responses to polls are often inconsistent with
their conduct.6 For example, David Duke consistently received more
votes for Louisiana Governor and Senator than polls predicted because people's concern that they might be viewed as bigoted made
individuals with only a high school education were satisfied with their lawyers; only
63% of individuals with post graduate education were satisfied with their lawyers. See
id. This compares with 47% of middle income New Yorkers who had a positive attitude toward the legal profession generally, 32% who had a negative attitude, and
19% who had neither a positive nor a negative attitude. See id. In England, the legal
profession is also viewed unfavorably, though most people are happy with their own
solicitors. See Haranguedby the Public and Pot Shots by the Press - It's a Lawyer's Life,
LAWYER, May 7, 1996, at 12-13.
61 See Samborn, supra note 51. The number of people who reported having had
business contact with lawyers in the five years preceding the survey rose from 52% in
1986 to 70% in 1993. See id. People generally expressed confidence that if they had
to hire a lawyer, she would be competent. See id. Also, people who used a lawyer
were more satisfied than dissatisfied with the lawyer's performance, though many
thought the lawyer charged too much. See id.
See Robert C. Post, On the PopularImage of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass,
75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987). One study showed that "guilty" individuals showed
a significant preference for procuring an unethical lawyer's services. SeeJack Hartnett & Gayle Secord, Perception of Unethical Behavior in an Attorney as a Function of Sex
of Observer and Transgressor,61 PERCEPTUAL& MOTOR SKILLS 1159, 1162 (1985).
63 See DIVERSIFIED RESEARCH, INC., supra note 60; Samborn, supra
note 51.
64 See Carroll J. Glynn, Perceptions of Others' Opinions as a Component of Public Opinion, 18 Soc. SQ. RES. 53, 67 (1989). In a study asking a sample group whether a
home for the mentally retarded should be built in their neighborhood, 80% said
they would not mind but the same number said their neighbors would mind. See id.
When a home for the mentally retarded was proposed in one of the sample neighborhoods, members of that group actively fought the incorporation of the home.
See id.
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them reluctant to tell pollsters the truth.65 Other surveys show that
more people, especially well-educated ones, are likely to say that they
voted than actually did because of the need to comply with the expected social norm. The more accepted the norm, the greater is the
likelihood that people will say that they complied with the norm. 66
Psychological studies have demonstrated that there often are inconsistencies between people's opinions and how they behave. 67 One
reason for this discrepancy is that people's perceptions of others'
opinions affect their own opinion." People's perception of majority
opinion may affect their behavior when there are strong positive or
negative sanctions attached to the behavior. In addition, as the situation becomes more public, the greater is the likelihood that percepbehavior.6 9
tions of others' opinions will influence an individual's
Opinions that are perceived to be majority views will frequently influence majority opinion even when those views do not really represent

majority views.

°

SeeJack W. Germond &Jules Witcover, Edge in Louisiana Goes to Edwards: Down
to the Wire, BALTiMORE EVENING SUN, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al; Mike Royko, Louisiana
Helping Us Measure Hatred,CHI. TRIB., Oct. 22, 1991, at 3; see also George F. Bishop &
Bonnie S. Fisher, "Secret Ballots" and Self-Reports in an Exit-Poll Experiment, 59 PUB.
OPINION Q. 568, 585 (1995) (finding secret ballots more accurate than face-to-face
polls in determining people's opinions on socially sensitive issues).
See George F. Bishop et al., Interest in Political Campaigns: The Influence of Question Order and Electoral Context, 6(2) POL. BEHAV. 159, 167 (1984). Similarly, in response to a survey people exaggerate the number of hours they work per year. One
sociologist observed that people made such claims "'because you are a good American if you put in long work hours."' Louis Uchitelle, More Work, Less Play MakeJack
Look Better Off, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, § 4, at 4 (quotingJohn Robinson, University
of Maryland sociologist).
67 See, e.g., Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical
Analysis and Review of Empirical Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 888 (1977); Melvin L.
DeFleur & Frank R. Westie, Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts: An Experiment on the Salience of Attitudes, 23 AM. Soc. REV. 667 (1958).
68 See Glynn, supra note 64, at 54.
9 See id. at
68.
70 SeeJames M. Fields & Howard Schuman, Public Beliefs About the Beliefs of the
Public, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 427, 445 (1976); Seymour Lipset, Youth and Politics, in
CONTEMP. SOC. PROBS. 771, 771-73 (Robert Merton & Robert Nisbet eds., 1971);
Hubert J. O'Gorman & Stephen L. Garry, Pluralistic Ignorance - A Replication and
Extension, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 449, 449-50 (1976); Hubert J. O'Gorman, Pluralistic
Ignoranceand White Estimates of White Supportfor Racial Segregation, 39 PUB. OPINION Q.
In some studies, psychologists have found evidence of a
313, 329-30 (1975).
"looking glass" effect. This causes people to believe that significant others share
their opinion on issues. See Glynn, supra note 64 at 55; For example, Fields and
Schuman reported that in 1971 less than 3% of the population disapproved of interracial playing by children, yet a majority of this tiny minority believed that most of
the population shared their views. See Fields & Schuman, supra, at 445.
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Survey results of opinions also may not reflect behavior because
people tend not to be adept at introspection; still others may not be
able to articulate their views effectively in response to the survey
questions." How survey questions are worded may also cause discrepancies between respondents' answers and their conduct.n
III. SYSTEMIC, CULTURAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES OF THE
NEGATIVE IMAGE OF LAWYERS

A.

Systemic Reasonsfor the Public's Low Opinion of Lawyers

Much of the public's attitude toward lawyers generally is attributable to the lawyer's role in our society. People frequently come
into contact with lawyers during stressful events in their lives - debt
collections and foreclosures, divorce, and death of loved ones. They
naturally associate lawyers with those events. Moreover, if they happen to be involved in litigation, they might associate lawyers with
their adversary and with the evils of the adversary system." A survey
done by Consumer Reports indicates that clients involved in nonadversarial proceedings tend to be relatively satisfied with their attorneys, whereas those involved in adversarial proceedings tended to be
more dissatisfied.7 4
From the nineteenth and twentieth century, continuing to today, the ability of the wealthy to afford top lawyers while the poor often cannot get any legal representation at all has fueled public animus toward the profession.
As discussed above, the public
perception that wealthy corporations hire expensive lawyers to do
their bidding exacerbates public distrust of lawyers. Cases like that of
See Glynn, supra note 64, at 54.
See Philip E. Converse & Michael W. Traugott, Assessing the Accuracy of Polls and
Surveys, 234 SCIENCE 1094, 1097 (1986) (noting that respondents are more likely to
say that they support a candidate following a series of questions that cast the candidate in a favorable light. On the other hand, respondents are less likely to report
that they follow politics closely after a number of difficult questions concerning their
local representatives).
See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201, 206 (7th Cir.
1978). See generally Robert Araujo, S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigmand Possibility,
50 SMU L. REv. 433 (1997) (arguing that one reason the public thinks badly of the
legal profession is that the modus operandi of many lawyers consists of aggressively
seeking all advantages and making no concessions, while coming dangerously close
to the ethical line).
7
7

74 See When You Need a Lawyer, CONSUMER REPS., Feb. 1996, at 34, 37.
About 27%

of the people who hired a lawyer for adversarial matters were dissatisfied with the
work. See id. Clients who hired lawyers to handle divorces and criminal matters were
the least satisfied. See id.
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o.J. Simpson cause the public to believe, perhaps correctly, that the
rich can buy justice. 7' Lawyers, then, became the popular whipping
boys for this perceived injustice.
Much of the public misunderstands the role of lawyers in the adversary system. 76 Many people apparently believe that lawyers should
be engaged in a search for truth. They misunderstand lawyers' primary task, which is to represent effectively their clients and to advance their clients' rights.7 8 Consequently, they believe that lawyers
are engaged in some sort of deceitful or unethical practice when, in
reality, lawyers are merely fulfilling their role in the adversary system.
The public's low opinion of lawyers may also stem from American lawyers' close connection to their unpopular clients and to
equally unpopular social causes. Furthermore, the lawyers' obligation of confidentiality and diligence to their clients and the duty to
avoid conflicts with their own interests may often preclude lawyers

75 See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE:

THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT

AWAY WITH MURDER 38-46 (1996). Bugliosi argues that although the media dubbed
Simpson's attorneys "the dream team" and "the best that money could buy," and
that although the public accepted this characterization - the attorneys' qualifications did not warrant such veneration. Id.; see also RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS
164 (1989) (citing a survey, which found that 60% of the public believes lawyers do
not work as hard for the poor as the rich and 59% believes the legal system favors
the rich).
76 See Vernon K. Dibble, Occupations and Ideologies, 68 AM.J. SOC. 229,
230 (196263).
77 As a result of OJ. Simpson's acquittal at his criminal trial, many members of
the public have negative attitudes toward his lawyers. See Court TV (television broadcast, Oct. 17, 1997). For that reason, Barry Scheck, one of Simpson's attorneys,
sought, unsuccessfully, to voir dire the jurors on their attitude toward him during
the nanny trial in Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. CRIM. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119
(Mass. Super. Nov. 10, 1997). See Court TV(television broadcast, Oct. 17, 1997).
78 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 7 (1990);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 121-23 (1978); see also
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1035 (1975). Judge Frankel observes that whereas the lawyers' primary role is advocating for the client and only coincidentally the search for truth, the primary objective of the judge should be the search for truth. See id. He argues that the system
should be changed, particularly in civil cases, so that the search for truth should
have a more significant role in the adversary system. See id. at 1059.
Even many lawyers misunderstand their function. SeeJohnson v. United States,
360 F.2d 844, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., concurring). Then Circuit Judge
Burger surmised that popular misconceptions about lawyers and lawyers' roles in
criminal cases have caused some lawyers improperly to view themselves as the
mouthpiece or the alter ego of the accused. See id. According to the court, these
misconceptions arise from many sources, including misconduct of the lawyers themselves, distortion of reality created by the media, particularly television and the movies, and a misplaced sentimentality, causing some lawyers to doubt their function.
See id.
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from explaining how their personal positions differ from those of
their clients. 79 In countries where lawyers can remain more aloof
from their clients, there may be less public identification of lawyers
with their clients and their issues. 80 The public's opinion of lawyers
may also stem from belief that lawyers are self-interested and seek to
monopolize the market for legal services to the detriment of the consuming public. Misbehaving lawyers may also contribute to the public's low opinion of lawyers.8
CulturalInfluences on the Public's View of Lawyers

B.

The public's perception of lawyers is shaped as much by fiction
as by reality. Because many people do not have much real-life contact with attorneys and the legal system, they are more likely to confuse the images depicted in the movies, on television, and in books
with reality.82 Negative images of lawyers in the movies may have
helped to lower the public's view of lawyers.83 Although many cur-

See Erwin N. Griswold, The Legal Profession, in TALKs ON AMERICAN LAW 273, 285
(1972). ABA Model Rule 1.2(b) provides that "[a] lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement
of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." MODEL RuLES
79

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(b) (1997). This rule supports a lawyer's legal
right to decline to handle a morally repugnant case. Others argue, however, that in
limited circumstances a lawyer may have a moral obligation to handle a case for a client seeking to vindicate a "legal right to an essential human need," even when the
client himself is personally repugnant. See Charles W. Wolfram, A Lawyer's Duty to
Represent Clients: Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICs 214-33 (David Luban ed., 1983)). See also Alan Donegan, Justifying
Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 137; GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.2:303. However, once a
lawyer decides to take a case, ABA Model Rules 1.7, 1.6, and 1.3 preclude that lawyer
from bad-mouthing a client or the client's cause.
80 See Anthony Lewis, Lawyers and Civilization, in THE OWEN ROBERTS MEMORIAL
LECTURES: 1957-1974, 257 (1975).
81 SeeABEL, supra note 75, at 164.
82 See David S. Machlowitz, Lawyers on TV., 74 A.B.A.
J. 52, 54-55 (Nov. 1988).
The large number of complaints received by the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility about the conduct of the lawyers on the television sitcom Night Court evidences the public's difficulty separating fact from fiction. See id,
8s See Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Fictions: Images of Supreme Court Justices in the
Novel, Drama, and Film, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 151, 203 (1997). Professor Ray traces the
decline in the positive portrayal of Supreme Court Justices to their depiction in
drama, novels, and film. See id. She suggests that the portrayal of the Justices has
resulted in the public having a skeptical attitude toward the worthiness of the Justices. See id. She argues, however, that the public opinion of the Supreme Court
and the legal system have not been affected by the negative image of the Justices
themselves. See id.
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rent movies portray lawyers in a bad light," a number of older movies
portrayed lawyers more favorably.8

Movies in which lawyers have been portrayed in an unfavorable light include
CLASS ACTION (TFI/Interscope 1990) (starring Gene Hackman as a crusading plaintiff's lawyer out to prove that a car maker distributed a car despite the knowledge
that it would blow up if it was involved in an accident when its left turn signal was
blinking. Hackman's daughter, Maggie, defense counsel, attempts improperly to
conceal evidence and knowingly elicit perjured testimony. She later has a conflict of
interest when she joins forces with her father to defeat her client, the evil car manufacturer); THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982) (starring Paul Newman as an
alcoholic lawyer who has his own ethical problems and has to deal with opposing
counsel who has sought to conceal and destroy evidence); THE FIRM (Paramount
1993) (about a law firm deeply involved in its clients illegal activities, starring Tom
Cruise); JAGGED EDGE (Columbia Pictures 1985) (in which a lawyer, played by Glenn
Close, is seduced by a guilty client (Jeff Bridges)); and ANATOMY OF A MURDER
(Columbia/Carlyle 1959) (starring James Stewart, who horsesheds a client - gives
him clues about how to frame his story so as to escape responsibility for killing his
wife's rapist. Notwithstanding his role, this author personally has doubts about
whether Stewart could ever put lawyers in a bad light.)
The late Gene Siskel, former movie critic for the Chicago Tribune, traced the
negative image of lawyers to movies like Dirty Hany, starring Clint Eastwood, in
which audiences see blameworthy people go free because of police who fail to meet
their obligations under the Miranda decision. See Movie Lauryers Get 'X" Rating, NAT'L
Lj.,July 7, 1980, at 35. Siskel observed that in AndJusticefor All, with one exception,
all the lawyers were rotten and "on the take, morally, ethically and financially." Id.
95
Most older movies and older television shows portrayed lawyers in a more
positive light. See PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL ASIMOW, REELJUSTIcE: THE COURTROOM
GOES TO THE MOVIES 103 (1996); Francis M. Nevins, Through the Great Depression on
Horseback, in LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS LEGAL TEXTS, 44, 63-64 (John Denvir ed.,
1996). See, e.g., THE MAN WHO SHOT LIBERTY VALENCE (Paramount Pictures 1962)
(starring James Stewart as a frontier lawyer who, despite being a senator and Ambassador to Great Britain and who could have had the vice presidential nomination for
the asking, is best remembered, incorrectly, for having shot the outlaw Liberty Valence (Lee Marvin). Ironically, the outlaw was shot by the drunk and forgotten Tom
Doniphon (John Wayne). The John Ford classic may tell us something about how
public misimpressions shape public opinion). See Cheyney Ryan, Print the Legend, in
LEGAL REELISM, supra at 23-24); INHERIT THE WIND (UA/Lomitas 1960) (Using almost
verbatim excerpts from the actual trial transcript of the "Scopes Monkey Trial,"
Spencer Tracy portrays defense attorney Henry Drummond, based upon Clarence
Darrow. Tracy cross-examines Frederick March (based upon William Jennings
Bryan) and destroys his credibility as an expert witness on the Bible). See James
Weigert, The Image of Trial Lawyers Through Hollywood's Eyes, N.Y. L.J., June 13, 1989,
at 5; MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1947) (good hearted attorney
Fred Gayley (John Payne) lets his client Kris Kringle (Edmund Gwynn) share his
apartment while he cleverly proves that Kringle is the real Santa Claus); YOUNG MR.
LINCOLN (Twentieth Century Fox 1939) (starring Henry Fonda as a lawyer who successfully defended two brothers wrongfully accused of murder. Lincoln accepted
only a few cents for his effort because that was all the boys' mother had). Frank Capra's MR. DEEDS GOES TO TOwN (Columbia 1936) was one of the few early films to
depict lawyers in a bad light. The bad lawyers try to steal the inheritance of a hick,
Gary Cooper, by trying to get him declared incompetent. See id
84
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Television has also tarnished the public's image of lawyers,
though it has done so indirectly - not through negative images but
by creating unjustified expectations. Television, particularly L.A.
Law, has portrayed attorneys as young, powerful, and physically attractive, with an artificially inflated percentage of female practitioners and criminal law specialists." Consequently, the image of the
well-to-do attorney, combined with talk of the high starting salaries
for associates at major law firms, tends to create the perception that
lawyers are greedy and motivated primarily by money. In addition,
some people may become disappointed as they discover that attorneys cannot solve problems nearly as rapidly as can their TV counterparts. This realization seems to have had some impact on the public's perception of lawyers even though the image of lawyers
portrayed on television is frequently positive.
American novels have tended to reflect the public's ambivalence
toward lawyers. Some lawyers are portrayed as greedy and manipulative and aligned with big business. Others are depicted as idealists
working for the public good.8 Even when lawyers are fighting business corruption or the inequities in the system, as in Sinclair Lewis's
Babbitt, they are often dismissed as "radical" or dangerous
"socialists."8 In popular novels, people may defer to an attorney's
expertise while simultaneously fearing that such power may be used
against them. 90 During the Depression era, most novelists depicted
lawyers as representatives of property owners who exploited their

See Michael Pfau et al., Television Viewing and Public Perceptions of Attorneys,
21(3) HUM. COMM. REs. 307, 312-13 (Mar. 1995) (citingJ. MEYROWTZ, NO SENSE
PLAcE: THE IMPACT OF ELEcraONIc MEDIA ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1985)).

OF

But see Char-

les B. Rosenberg, Inside L.A. Law, 74 A.B.A. J. 56, 56-57 (Nov. 1988) (a legal advisor
to L.A. Law argues that the show more accurately depicts the legal profession than
other television shows because it shows clients who are both guilty and innocent,
lawyers who both lose and win, and difficult ethical decisions that lawyers must
make).
87 See Pfau et al. supra note
86, at 324-27.
See generally Donald G. Baker, The Lawyer in Popular Fiction, 3 J. POPULAR
CULTURE 494 (1969). In Winston Churchill's early 20th century novels, such as Mr.

Crewe's Career, he portrays railroad lawyers who ignore public safety and who are reat 496, 498. In the same novel,
sponsible for intolerable working conditions. See id.
he also portrays lawyers who battle the railroads in the public interest. See id. at 498.
Similarly, in A Far Country, Churchill depicts a corporation lawyer who breaks with
the system and then supports the people as they attempt to retake control of the political system. See id. at 499. In a number of novels of the 1920s, such as Anita Loos's
Gentlemen PreferBlondes and Louis Bromfield's A Good Woman, lawyers are portrayed
as self-centered, corrupt and untrustworthy. See id. at 501.
8
W

See id. at 501.

See id. at 497.
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poorer neighbors.9 ' Later in the century, the dual image of lawyers
continues to appear. Within the same novel, some lawyers may be
cynical and dishonest while others are honest and fight for matters
based on principle."
C. Psychological Reasonsfor Dislike of Lawyers
Negative jokes about lawyers have both contributed to and reinforced negative stereotypes about lawyers. 9 Certainly, images and
metaphors can influence people's opinions. Because words are an
incomplete form of communication, people often obtain their perception of reality through metaphors and images.9 For example,
when Nazis spoke of the "Jewish bacillus" or the 'Jewish cancer," it
was then easier for them to treat the Jews as subhuman.9 5
Psychological studies have found that individuals who already
have negative feelings toward a certain group are most likely to enjoy
negative jokes about members of that group.9 Studies have also97
found that disparagement humor can influence people's attitudes.
One study found that subjects who freely told negative jokes about
lawyers aroused dissonance among the subjects, thereby causing
more negative attitudes among the joke tellers.9 It can be expected
that members of an audience exposed to such jokes would likely become more negatively disposed toward lawyers. They would tend to
believe that the majority of the public viewed lawyers negatively and
91

See id. at 502. John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath is an example of this genre.

See id.

See id. at 506. John O'Hara's Ten North Frederick, published in 1957, depicts an
honest lawyer, Joe Chapin, battling the dishonest and calculating lawyer-politicians.
See id.
93 See Karen L. Hobden & James M. Olson, From jest to Antipathy: Disparagement
Humor as a Source of Dissonance-MotivatedAttitude Change, 15(3) BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 239, 246-48 (1994).
See generally GARY MINDA, BoYcoTr IN AMERICA:

How

IMAGINATION AND

IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND (1999).
95 See id. at 70-71 (quoting HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON
IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 19-29 (1992); GEORGE L. MOSSE, THE CRISIS OF GERMAN IDEOLOGY: INTELLECruAL ORIGINS OF THE THIRD REicH 143 (1966)).

See generallyJoanne R. Cantor & Dolf Zillman, Resentment Toward Victimized Protagonists and Severity of Misfortunes They Suffer as Factors in Humor Appreciation, 6 J.
EXPERIMENTAL RES. IN PERSONALITY 321 (1973); Lawrence La Fave et al., HumorJudgments as a Function of Identification Classes, 58 Soc. & Soc. RES. 184 (1974); Frank W.
Wicker et al., DisparagementHumor: Dispositions and Resolutions, 39 J. PERSONALrIY &
Soc. PSYCHOL 701 (1980); Dolf Zillman & Joanne R. Cantor, A Disposition Theory of
Humour and Mirth, in HUMOR AND LAUGHTER: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS

93 (A.J. Chapman & H.C. Foot eds., 1976).
See Hobden & Olson, supra note 93, at 246.
g See id. at 246-47.
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would therefore be more likely to share such a negative view themselves."
Negative jokes about lawyers and hostility toward lawyers can
also be attributed to people's psychological need to find scapegoats.
Difficult life conditions combined with the need to blame someone
00
other than oneself for life's conditions can lead to scapegoating.
Scapegoating allows people to feel superior to the scapegoats. By labeling the scapegoats as outsiders, it also allows the scapegoaters to
feel that they are part of a group. 0 ' Usually, the scapegoated group
or individual is a person or a group who has previously been devalued or discriminated against.'02 Professor Robert C. Post has even
suggested that the public scapegoats lawyers because they see characteristics in lawyers that they dislike in themselves. 03 If that is true,
then attempts to improve the image of the lawyer will be largely futile.
Many lawyers have become very concerned about the public's
view of them, perhaps because of insecurity or the need to feel wellliked.'0 As a way to improve their image and sometimes to advance
other agendas, they have advanced a wide range of policies ranging
from restricting lawyer advertising and solicitation to banning cameras from the courtroom. In light of the public's long-held negative
opinion of lawyers, it is unlikely that such fixes will improve the image of lawyers. Moreover, public policy should not be dictated by the
need to help lawyers' self-image. The important question is not
whether lawyers will feel bad because the public has a poor image of
them, but whether the public will be hurt by this image of lawyers.
This issue will be explored in the next section.
IV. WHY CARE ABOUT THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF LAWYERS?

The legal profession should care about the public image of lawyers only if there is some connection between public behavior and
the negative image of lawyers generally. Even then one must recognize that regulating lawyer behavior (for example, restricting attorSee Glynn, supra note 64, at 53, 68.
10 See Ervin Staub, The Psychology of Perpetratorsand Bystanders, 6(1) POL. PSYcIOL.
61, 70-71 (1985).
101 See id.

102 See id. at
71, 73.
103 See Post, supra note 62, at 389.
104 SeeJerome J. Shestack, Respecting Our Profession: In This Difficult Profession, Let
Us Try to Earn Our Self-respect, 83 A.B.A. J. 8, 8 (Dec. 1997) (arguing that lawyers
should not care about their negative public image, but should instead concentrate
on having respect for themselves).
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ney advertising) creates other costs. Lawyers should only be willing
to regulate based on image if there is evidence that the image gains
to be derived from the regulation outweigh the other costs imposed
by the regulation.
It has been argued that the low image of lawyers generally will
cause people to stop retaining lawyers when they really need them.
This argument is undercut by evidence that more people are using
lawyers. '0 Furthermore, people are generally happy with their own
lawyer's
services, even while critical of the image of lawyers gener1
0
ally.
It also erroneously assumes that people will behave in a way that
is contrary to their own economic interests. People may be willing to
scapegoat attorneys; however, they are unwilling to cut off their noses
to spite their faces by refusing to retain them or failing to make use
of the legal system. By analogy, minorities have been scapegoated
when the majority believed it was in their economic interest to do
SO.

107

Because it will often be in their economic interest to use lawyers,
one need not be concerned about the image of the lawyer causing
the public not to retain lawyers unless the cost of acquiring information about the utility of legal services is so high that the public will
make irrational decisions' s The wide availability of information
about the utility of lawyers' services (for example, word of mouth and
advertising) helps explain why the public is not foregoing lawyers'
services even though they may harbor negative feelings about the
profession in general.
Some commentators have argued that a good image of the legal
system is necessary for it to have legitimacy in the eyes of the public. '1 9
This assumes, however, that the public will lose confidence in the legal system because it has a bad view of lawyers in general. This assumption is unwarranted. The public may think badly of lawyers because they perceive lawyers to be greedy or unduly aggressive in
acquiring clients. This has nothing to do with public confidence that
105
106

107

See Samborn, supra note 51.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Staub, supra note 100, at 77; see also David E. Sanger, A Price Tag of Billions

in Nazi Gold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1997, at A4.
108 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

OF LAw 19 (5th ed. 1998). Judge
Posner reasons that even if uncertainty about the value of any individual attorney
caused a client not to retain that particular attorney, no great harm would be caused
since, presumably, there are many other attorneys who would be able to perform
equally well. See id.
10 See, e.g., James C. Jenkins, The Public Image of Lawyers, 8 UTAH
B.J. 5 (1995).
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will be decided fairly. Unlike judges, lawyers do not decide
cases Ito
cases.
Professor Selinger argues that the number and quality of law
school applicants has declined in part because of the poor public image of lawyers."' He contends that because the public sees lawyers as
unethical, more people of questionable integrity will be interested in
becoming lawyers. Consequently, the poor public image will indirectly lead to more lawyers of low character. He also contends that
because the public holds them in low esteem, lawyers will possess a
low self-image and will be more likely to commit unethical conduct
than will members of a profession with a better image. Finally, he
argues that the hope of maintaining public esteem will cause the bar
to be more likely to police itself.
Professor Selinger may be right that the image of lawyers has a
bearing on the number of people applying to law school. However,
that image may be shaped more by shows such as L.A. LawI 12 than by
influences that the profession can control. It is also likely shaped by
perceptions about the quality of the job market."3 His argument that
the public's low image of lawyers will cause lawyers to engage in more
unethical conduct seems rather suspect. Lawyers' decisions to engage in unethical conduct will more likely depend on factors such as
their own financial situation, the tendency to bite off more than they
can chew, the temptations they face, the likelihood of being caught
4
and the attendant consequences, and substance abuse problems."

10

For this reason, the public perception ofjudges is much more important than

the view of lawyers. See generally Leonard Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First
Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1181, 1187 (1986).
I See Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preservingthe Dignity and Unity of the
Le1al Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 867-68 (1997).
See Machlowitz, supra note 82, at 52; Pfau et al., supra note 86, at 307, 325-26;
Victoria A. Roberts, The Law and The Media: Do We Have Internal Barometers?, 76
MIcH. B.J. 384, 384 (May 1997).
n1 See David H. Vernon & Bruce I. Zimmer, The Size and Quality of the Law School
Applicant Pool: 1982-1986 and Beyond, 1987 DUKE L.J. 204, 227. The authors note
that graduate professional education in general declined during the 1980s, sparked
in part by increased undergraduate interest in vocational education, engineering,
computer science, and other technical fields. See id. at 227. This shift was probably
caused by the increased availability of jobs, coupled with the high cost of graduate
professional school. See id. The perception that the financial return from attending
professional school in general, and law school in particular, may be modest because
of oversupply of professionals likely contributed to the trend as well. See id
114 See Alix Armstead, Speech at the Southern Illinois University School
of Law
(April 13, 1998) (Alix Armstead is counsel to the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission).
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The argument that low public opinion of lawyers has eroded
their self-esteem and that they are therefore inclined to risk even further loss and degradation through unethical acts seems counterintuitive. First, there is little evidence to support Professor Selinger's
premise that lawyers are lacking in self-esteem. Lawyers are more
likely to be viewed as arrogant than lacking in self-confidence." 5 Furthermore, his conclusion that their low self-esteem will cause them to
engage in unethical conduct also seems contrary to basic principles
of economic self-interest. Many lawyers currently fear discipline because (1) it can mean loss of income if they are suspended or lose
their license, and (2) it can mean loss of clients and loss of respect
from colleagues when discipline becomes public."16 Whether or not
the legal profession has a low image generally, lawyers believe that
members of the public will prefer to retain lawyers who have not
been subject to discipline.
V.

RELIANCE ON THE IMAGE OF LAWYERS IN COURT DECISIONS

Courts have used the need to protect the image of the lawyer as
a reason for decisions in a number of areas. It has been used to jus-

115

SeeJohn Batt, American Legal Populism: A Jurisprudentialand HistoricalNarrative,

Including Reflections on Critical Legal Studies, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 651, 676 (1995)
(recounting Gerry Spence's description of lawyers as "arrogant, greed-driven, ethically suspect, and interpersonally offensive"); James P. Hemmer, Resignation of Corporate Counsel: Fulfillment or Abdication of Duty, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 656 (March 1988)
("[S]uccessful corporate lawyers generally are not lacking self-confidence, assertiveness, and on some occasions, even arrogance."); Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Focus
ofJudgment Effect: A Question Wording Effect Due to Hypothesis Confirmation Bias, 18(6)
PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 690, 695 (1992) (discussing an empirical study
in which the stereotypical attorney was described as a very self-confident person);
Michael Nava, Lawyers As Writers, 22 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 13, 13 (Aug. 1996) (noting
that lawyers have a reputation for arrogance and excessive self-confidence).
16 See Charles R. DiSalvo, The Fracture of Good Order: An Argument
for Allowing
Lawyers to Counsel the Civilly Disobedient, 17 GA. L. REv. 109, 135-36 (1982); Steven
Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A "PublicAssets" Theory of Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligations, 145
U. PA. L. REv. 1245, 1267-68 (1997); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law
Firms, 77 CoRNEsLL L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1991). Interestingly, there is some evidence
that guilty people may prefer to retain unethical lawyers. See Hartnett & Secord, supra note 62, at 1162. Even if this is true, it tell us little about the incentives for noncriminal attorneys, since criminal defense work represents only a small percentage
of the work handled by lawyers. See Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531, 543 (1994) ("The four largest categories of work actually taken to lawyers by individuals involve real estate, estate planning, marital problems, and torts, in that order."); Richard L. Fricker, Dirty Money,
75 A.BA.J. 60, 64 (Nov. 1989) (the number of criminal defense attorneys is decreasing significantly); William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 793
(1988) (criminal defense representation is seen as one of the least desirable areas of
practice by attorneys, and the public image of the criminal defense bar is low).
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tify restrictions on attorney advertising and solicitation and disqualification of lawyers with conflicts of interest. It has also been used as a
basis for refusing to approve an award of attorneys' fees and for implying or refusing to imply a cause of action. It has even been used as
a basis for keeping cameras out of the courtroom. Finally, it has
been used to justify sanctions for misconduct by attorneys and judges.
This section will examine the use and misuse of lawyers' image in
court decisions.
A.

Attorney Advertising and Solicitation

Proponents of restricting attorney advertising and solicitation
have frequently cited the need to protect the public's image of lawyers as one of a number of reasons to support the restriction." 7 To
the extent that advocates even attempt to relate public image of lawyers to public behavior, some argue that attorney advertising and solicitation will so harm the image of lawyers that people will be less
willing to retain lawyers." 8 This argument is undercut by another argument often advanced against attorney advertising and solicitation
that it will stir up litigation." 9 It is also undercut by survey eviIn 1988, the ABA's Commission on Advertising drafted a nonregulatory
document entitled Aspirational Goals on Lauyer Advertising. In its preamble, the
commission stated that "empirical evidence suggests that undignified advertising can
detract from the public's confidence in the legal profession and respect for the justice system." Id. Its second aspirational goal stated that advertising by lawyers
should help the public understand their rights and the judicial process and should
uphold the dignity of the legal profession. See id.
118 There is one survey suggesting that lawyers who advertise may be giving themselves a black eye. See Mark B. Traylor & Alicia M. Mathias, The Impact of TVAdvertis17

ing Versus Word of Mouth on the Image of Lawyers: A Projective Experiment, 12(4) J.

42 (1983). In this survey, a small sample of predominantly white upper
class shoppers at a mall were questioned about how their attitude was affected by
reading passages where the client learns about the lawyer by word-of-mouth, by television, and by a combination of the two. See id. at 43. The survey found that people
had a more negative image of lawyers who advertised only by television unaccompanied by favorable word-of-mouth. See id. at 42, 45. The survey was meant to be
ADVERTISING

.suggestive" rather than "definitive" since it relied on "projective" methodology

rather than actual treatment - there was no exposure to the actual ad, only a report
about a lawyer who advertises. See id. at 45. In addition, it may understate the bene-

fits of television since the creative execution of a television ad could strongly affect
the image created. See id. The author of the study also noted that attorneys who
wanted volume business might still prefer advertising because it might enable them
to focus on viewer awareness and price. See id. Finally, the survey did not attempt to
measure the effect of advertising on survey participants' view of lawyers generally.
See id.
119

The Supreme Court, in Zaudererv. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,

643 (1985), properly rejected the "stirring up litigation" argument as a ground to
justify a rule that forbade a lawyer from giving advice to a client in an advertisement
and then representing that client. Id. The Court observed that all litigation is not
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dence indicating that people are using lawyers more than ever.'" A
recent survey indicating that the public views their own lawyers favorably' also undercuts the notion that attorney advertising or solicitations will cause people to be less likely to retain lawyers. Moreover,
there is no reason to think that attorney mailings would cause the
public to think less of the judicial system generally. More likely reasons for any recent upsurge in hostility toward lawyers are: misunderstanding of lawyers' role in the adversary system, the O.J. Simpson
verdict, the inability of the poor to get equal access to the system, the
long delays in cases going to trial, and the size of attorney fees. However, redressing these rather major problems would seem unlikely to
alter the public's longstanding attitude toward lawyers.
Until the recent case of Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.,ss the Supreme Court had consistently refused to find the need to protect the
image of lawyers as a sufficiently compelling reason to override the
First Amendment interest of the advertising lawyer and her audience.
For example, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counse42 3 the Supreme Court found a rule prohibiting drawings in attorneys' advertisements to be an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of speech.
In so doing, the court rejected an argument that the need to protect
the public from unsavory images justified the ban. The Court stated:
More fundamentally, although the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensuring that its attorneys behave with dignity
and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications
with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the
abridgment of their First Amendment rights. Even if that were
the case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior would
tend to recur so often as to warrant a prophylactic rule.... [T] he
mere possibility that some members of the population might find
advertising embarrassing or offensive cannotjustify suppressing it.
The same must hold true for advertising that some members of
the bar might find beneath their dignity.

evil. To the contrary, litigation might be necessary to deter the dissemination of unsafe products or to compensate those who have been victimized by such products.
See id.
120 See Samborn, supra note 51.
Although advocates favoring restricting attorney
advertising might argue that but for lawyer image problems the public might use
lawyer services even more frequently, there is no empirical evidence to support this.
See DIVERSIFIED RESEARCH, INC., supra note 60; see also supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
515 U.S. 618 (1995).
2
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
124

Id. at 647-48.
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In Went for It, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida rule barring
targeted mailings by lawyers to accident victims within thirty days of
an accident. The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Shapero v.
Kentucky BarAss'n,"5 which had found a blanket ban on targeted mailings to be unconstitutional. The Court found Shapero to be distinguishable because (1) in Shapero the state sought to justify the ban by
relying on the need to protect the public from attorney overreaching
and did not rely primarily on the need to safeguard the privacy of recipients; (2) the ban in Shapero was a blanket ban, whereas the ban in
Went for It was only a thirty-day ban; and (3) the need to protect the
image of lawyers, which might be tarnished by people receiving such
mailings, was found to be sufficiently compelling in light of empirical
evidence presented by the State of Florida regarding Floridians' attitudes toward lawyer advertising and solicitation. ' 2
The majority could have rested its opinion exclusively on the
need to protect the privacy interests of individuals. The Court could
simply have found the interest asserted in Went for It more substantial
and the restriction on mailings better tailored than the blanket ban
on targeted mailings that the Court had held to be unconstitutional
in Shapero.'" Although privacy concerns seem somewhat overstated
since only mailings were at issue in Went for It, they seem more substantial than the Court's reliance on "empirical" evidence of the supposed connection between targeted mailing and the public's attitude
toward lawyers. The dissent correctly observed that this evidence was
largely anecdotal and focused more on the public's attitude toward
advertising generally than it did on its attitude toward targeted mailings. 2 8 In addition, the methodology used in many of the polls was
flawed: Samples were too small, and conclusions vastly overstated the
results of the polls.'29
125
16
127

486 U.S. 466 (1988).
See Wentfor It, 515 U.S. at 618-19.
Cf Texans Against Censorship v. State Bar of Tex., 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1371 (E.D.

Tex. 1995), in which the court sustained the constitutionality of most of Texas's
rules on lawyer advertising, which were patterned on the ABA Model Rules. The
court justified its decision by the need to protect the public from false and misleading advertising. See id. at 1346-47. The plaintiffs argued that this justification was
merely pretextual, and that the defendant's real purpose was to protect the legal
profession's image and well-established lawyers from having to compete with lawyers
who advertise. See id. at 1347-48. The court rejected the pretextual argument, relyini2on the "false and misleading"justification. See id. at 1348-49.
See Wentfor It, 515 U.S. at 640-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
no See FRANK N. MAGID ASSOcS., ATnrTUDES & OPINIONS OF FLORIDA ADULTS
TOwARD

DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING BYATrORNEYS 10-11 (Dec. 1987).

The surveys conducted

on behalf of the Florida Bar to support its position on limiting attorney advertisement were riddled with problems. See ic at 10. The first major problem was an in-
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More fundamentally, there was nothing in the "empirical evidence" to indicate that the thirty-day ban on targeted mailings would
have any impact on the public's attitude toward lawyers.s" After all,
the public's negative opinion predates lawyer advertising and solicitation. Moreover, even if targeted mailings did have an impact on the
public's view of lawyers, there is no necessary connection between
that belief and how the public behaves toward the justice system or in
retaining or confiding in its own lawyers.
In cases involving radio and television advertising, two lower
courts considered the impact on the public image of the lawyer in
reaching their decisions. In In re Felmeister & Isaacs,"" the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered from constitutional and public policy
accurate portrayal of the data. The public's opinion of lawyers who advertise was not
as negative as the Florida Bar survey stated it to be. For example, the survey states:
"The research also presents evidence that direct mail advertising may result in less
positive attitudes toward the legal profession and the judicial process." Id. This
statement was based on only 11% of those surveyed answering this way, discounting
the fact that 83% responded otherwise. The survey adds that it contains "an even
more direct indication" of less positive attitudes toward attorneys. Id This "direct
indication" is based on only 27% of those surveyed saying that they have a lower regard for the legal profession, again ignoring the fact that 69% have an attitude that
is either more favorable or unchanged. See id. at 11.
Another problem with the survey was the improper influence of the Florida Bar.
For example, 200 people total were to be surveyed from three distinct groups of individuals who had received direct mail advertisement. See id. at 13. Group one consisted of 31,400 people who had received personal injury letters from lawyers
deemed "major filers." See id. Group two consisted of 66,400 people who had received personal injury letters. See id. Group three consisted of 85,900 people who
received letters pertaining to issues other than personal injury. See id. Instead of
using a mathematical percentage based on the actual number of recipients within
each group to determine how many people from each group would comprise the
total 200 surveyed, the methodology section of the survey states that the decision was
based in part "on conversations with staff of the Florida Bar." Id. at 14. These conversations resulted in an over-representation of people who had received the more
inflammatory personal injury advertisements. Of the 200 surveyed, 75 came from
group one and 75 from group two, the personal injury recipients, but only 50 came
from group three, the non-personal injury recipients, even though group three is
almost as large as groups one and two combined, and nearly twice as large as group
one alone. See id.
Additionally, in some cases the sample sizes were too small to produce a statistically accurate survey. For example, an opinion survey of business and industry leaders consisted of interviewing only 10 government officials. See HILL & KNOWLTON,
THE FLORIDA BAR COMMUNICATIONS AUDIT, OPINION LEADERS BUSINESS/INDUSTRY
STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT - SURVEY SUMMARY 35 (May 1985). Also, a consumer

focus survey consisted of only 30 members of the public. See id. at 199.
130
See Lyle Denniston, Layers'Image? That's Worth a Few Good Laughs, AM. LAw.,
Apr. 1995, at 90. Even members of the Court who voted with the majority in Went for
It joked during oral argument about the ability of the court through regulation to
improve the public's view of lawyers. See id.
104 N.J. 515, 518 A.2d 188 (1986).
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perspectives whether to uphold a rule requiring that all attorney advertising be presented in a dignified manner without the use of drawings, animations, dramatization, music, or lyrics. Ultimately, the New
Jersey Supreme Court decided that free speech considerations precluded the requirement that all advertisements be presented in a
dignified manner. Similarly, the restriction on drawings and illustrations could not pass constitutional muster after Zauderer. However,
the court promulgated a modified rule, which required that all attorney advertising be predominantly informational, and limited the
prohibition on the use of drawings, animations, dramatizations, music, or lyrics to television advertising. It struck down the requirement
that advertising be "dignified." In so doing, the court relied primarily on the need to protect the public from being misled by irrelevant
considerations such as the choice of music, which might have nothing to do with the quality of the service offered. The court was unwilling to allow consumers complete discretion in deciding which information to consider in selecting an attorney. The court's decision
raises serious First Amendment problems based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Zauderer, which held unconstitutional a blanket
ban on illustrations in attorney advertising.'" The court, however,
believed that its decision would not be overturned by the Supreme
Court because the Supreme Court had previously dismissed an appeal attacking the constitutionality of restrictions on television advertising in Iowa.'
As an additional justification in support of its decision, the Felneister & Isaacs court stressed the need to preserve public confidence
in the bar and the bench coupled with the need to preserve professionalism.'3' The court did not fully explain why lawyers running distasteful ads would cause a decline in the public's perception of the
legal profession. The court merely asserted that "[w] e do not believe
an expert is needed to demonstrate that a substantial number of
people seeing or hearing such an ad... would be disgusted not only
with the lawyer running the ad, but generally with the bar, and additionally with the court that permits it.''1 s5 Nor did the court really explain the harm that might result if the people lost confidence in lawyers in genera4 as opposed to their own lawyers. It merely pointed out

1s2
133

See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text (discussing Zauderer).
See Humphrey v. Committee on Prof'lEthics & Conduct, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986)

(mem.), dismissing appealfor want of a substantialfederal questionfrom 377 N.W.2d 643
(Iowa 1985).
B4 See Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J.
at 543, 518 A.2d at 203.
15 Id.
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how these ads would make it more difficult to change the public's
opinion of lawyers notwithstanding
the many lawyers who had do3 6
nated their services pro bono.

On an even more speculative note, the court "reasoned" that attorney advertising raises the concern that the legal profession will
degenerate into 'Just another trade."'317 The result of that, the court

speculated, would be to cause lawyers to be less willing to perform
public service, to do pro bono work, and to represent unpopular
causes without charge." If lawyers are willing to buck public opinion
to represent unpopular causes without charge, it seems hard to believe that they would be deterred from so doing by the public's negative view of lawyers resulting from lawyer advertising and solicitation.
More generally, the court offered no evidence and no support for its
assumption that lawyers who do pro bono work would stop doing it
because of any decline in the public's view of lawyers generally. The
assumption that advertising leads to a decline in professionalism also
contradicts the conclusion - reached by the Supreme Court in the9
seminal case involving lawyer advertising, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona1
that lawyers do not need to conceal from their clients the real life
fact that they earn a living by practicing law. 4°
In Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 4' the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state ethics rule restricting television advertising to a single non-dramatic voice, which
was not that of the lawyer, and which contained no other background
sound.1 42 The majority reasoned that television advertising allows
viewers much less opportunity for reflection and study than does
print advertising.43 Therefore, in order to protect the public from
overreaching and misleading advertising, the majority concluded that
such restrictions on television advertising were constitutional.'
However, in a special concurrence, three justices of the Iowa
Supreme Court also based their decision on the need to preserve the
public image of lawyers so that the appearance ofjustice could be sat16
137

See id. at 543-44, 518 A.2d at 203.
See id. at 526, 518 A.2d at 193.

138 See id.
139
140

433 U.S. 350 (1977).
See id. at 370-72; see also Moore v. Morales, 843 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (S.D. Tex.

1994).

141377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 475 U.S. 1114 (1986) (mem.).
,.2
143
'4

See id.at 645-46.

See id. at 646-47.
See id. at 647.
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isfied. "' The opinion stated that lawyers are "inextricably and logically connected, in the public view, with the application of law and
the protection of constitutional rights."'4 It then stressed the need
for lawyers to be skilled advocates and the problems posed by laymen
representing themselves or laymen represented by inept practitioners.4 4 The opinion does not explain, however, how a few lawyers
utilizing television advertising would cause the public to believe that
the entire judicial system has been compromised. Nor does it explain how those lawyers who do advertise would cause the public to
believe that they would fail skillfully to advocate for their clients.
The most extensive study done on lawyer advertising shows that
49
"dignified advertising" promotes respect for the legal profession.
Furthermore, print advertising was not found to be inherently more
dignified than television advertising.'4 9 Finally, lawyers themselves
had a more negative view of advertising than did members of the
public. 50 Perhaps this is not too surprising given that many established lawyers have an economic advantage when their lesser-known
competitors' opportunities for self-promotion are restricted.' 5' There
has been one study showing that lawyer advertising caused a decline
in the public's perception of the legal profession. ' However, one
should not be too quick to attach importance to any study purporting
See id. at 648 (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 649 (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring).
147 See Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d at 649 (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring).
14 See ABA COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, REPORT ON THE
SURVEY ON THE
14

146

IMAGE OF

55 (Jan. 1990); see also COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, INC.,
LAWYERA)VERTISING (1985); Tom L. Lee, Lawyer Advertising: One Component of an Effective Marketing Program,TRIAL, Jan. 1988, at 22 (reporting the results of a nationwide survey of consumer attitudes toward legal advertising, showing that 80% believed advertising was a good way to learn about the legal system and lawyers); Milo
Geyelin, Debate Intensifies Over State Regulations that Restrict TV Advertising by Lawyers,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at B1.
1
SeeABA COMM'N ONADVERTISING, supra note 148, at 54.
os See id. at 53.
151See ABEL, supra note 75, at 6-7 (observing the long history of attempts to restrict new lawyers by numerous means, including restrictions on unauthorized practice of law, residency requirements, minimum fee schedules, and prohibitions on
lawyer advertising and solicitation).
1 See W. Ward Reynoldson, The Case Against Lawyer Advertising, 75 A.B.A. J. 60, 60
(Jan. 1989). The article cited the results of a survey conducted at the direction of
the Iowa Supreme Court. See id. The survey showed that the attitudes of survey participants about lawyers declined sharply after viewing law firm advertisements:
trustworthiness (71% to 14%), professionalism (71% to 21%), honesty (65% to
14%), and integrity (45% to 14%). A study commissioned by the Florida Bar, relied
on by the Supreme Court in Wentfor It, 515 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1995), showed that advertising increased pre-existing biases the public had that jury awards were too high
and that lawyers could be bought and sold. See Geyelin, supranote 148, at BI, B4.
LAWYERS IN ADVERTISING
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to demonstrate a linkage one way or the other between lawyer advertising and the public perception of the legal profession. To date, no
one has effectively demonstrated a correlation between people's
conduct and lawyer advertising.'53
It is even harder to establish a link between the public's conduct
and lawyer advertising or solicitation when one considers that the
public viewed lawyers in a poor light even before lawyer advertising
and solicitation. The concurring opinion in Humphrey does not explain why lawyer advertising, which was common in the nineteenth
century, was not thought to pose a problem until the end of the nineteenth century when lawyers developed the notion that advertising
made them look like tradesmen. 54 The opinion did not offer any
support for its implication that lawyer advertising would cause the
public to stop retaining lawyers or, instead, to retain inept lawyers.
To the contrary, studies have shown that lawyer advertising is of use
lawyers and also tends to drive down the
to some people in selecting
155
price of legal services.

Even if one could demonstrate that the public's attitude toward
lawyers generally was affected by lawyer advertising or solicitation,
one should not automatically reach the conclusion that therefore
lawyer advertising and solicitation should be banned. One would still
have to compare the importance of preserving the public's view of
lawyers generally to the importance of making information about
lawyers accessible. Too much importance has been attached to the
public's view of the lawyer's image. In Ficker v. Curran,'56 a federal dis,53 One study of 54 personal injury and medical malpractice trials in state court in
Las Vegas found that jurors voted against plaintiffs whose lawyers used television advertising more than twice as often (83.3%) as against plaintiffs who did not advertise
on television (40.3%). However, the survey's author, Stephanie M. Myers, believed
that the survey was too small and did not account for other factors that might have
influenced jurors' decisions. Myers stated that she could not pinpoint any cause and
effect relationship between the verdicts and television advertising. See Geyelin, supra
note 148, at B1.
154 See Schwartz v. Welch, 890 F. Supp. 565, 572-73 (S.D. Miss. 1995). Professor
Charles Wolfram in his testimony in the Schwartz case pointed out that Abraham
Lincoln had advertised. See id. at 572. He also opined that the negative image of
lawyers was attributable to the work that lawyers perform and the "human foibles" of
some lawyers, rather than to lawyer advertising. See id. at 573. He also testified that
it was only at the end of the 19th century that lawyers used peer pressure and then
state ethics rules to restrict or ban lawyer advertising. See id.
155 See ABA COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, supra note 148, at 55; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION
392 (3d ed. 1994); REPORT OF THE STAFF TO THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING
CONSUMER AccEss TO LEGAL SERvIcEs:
TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING (1984).

156 950 F. Supp. 123 (D. Md. 1996).

THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON
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trict court found that a thirty-day ban on written solicitations to people charged with certain serious crimes abridged the First Amendment despite a claim that this restriction was similar to the restriction
found constitutional in Went for It. '7 The court noted that the importance of getting information in the thirty-day period in the criminal
context was much more important than the need to get information
within a thirty-day window in a civil suit.'s The court recognized that
the public perception of attorneys might be affected by the solicitation.'59 The court observed, however, that one who had been arrested for drunken driving would likely not be offended by receipt of
information about legal services so much as he would be offended by
the fact that someone had discovered that he had been arrested16
The court also noted that information on arrests is part of the public
record and is not a sufficient justification to restrict even commercial
speech.'6'
There are two fundamental problems with the assumption that
lawyer advertising and solicitation are largely responsible for the
negative public view of lawyers. First, it fails to consider all the other
information to which clients are exposed that causes them to perceive lawyers negatively. For example, many people derive their image of lawyers from fictional movies and television shows.' 62 It also
fails to consider the historical, cultural, and psychological reasons
that cause the public to have poor images of lawyers. Second, it attaches too much importance to preserving the public image.
Restricting lawyer advertising and solicitation is also troubling
because it allows members of the practicing bar to advance their own
economic self-interest by having the bar association propose a rule
restricting advertising and solicitation, a rule which is later adopted
by the state supreme court.163 In view of the tenuous connection be157
15

See id. at 129.

See id. at 128.

159See id. at 127-28.
161

See id. at 128.
See id.

162

See supra text accompanying notes 82-87. A 1993 poll in The National Law Jour-

160

nal reported that Perry Mason (played by Raymond Burr) and Matlock (played by

Andy Griffith) are two of the 10 most admired attorneys. See Randall Samborn,
Who's Most Admired Lawyer, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 24. Even sadder, more
Americans recognized Judge Wapner's name (of People's Court fame), than could
name any Supreme Court Justice. See Thom Weidlich, A Cynical Age Sees Few Heroes
in its Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 29, 1993, at S26.
1

Typically, state rules of professional conduct for attorneys are patterned after

the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are adopted by the ABA

House of Delegates. In many states, state and local bar associations are also active in
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tween lawyer advertising/solicitation and the public interest and because of the inherent subjectivity in determining which advertisements and solicitations will create a poor image, it seems particularly
inappropriate for self-interested members of the bar to advance such
restrictions.
B.

Conflicts of Interest

At one time the American Bar Association (ABA) Rules of Professional Conduct contained, in Canon 9 and in its Ethical Considerations, a direction for lawyers to "avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety."' Because of its vagueness, most courts refused to use Canon 9 as a basis for discipline; in 1975, even the ABA
rejected its use. 65 The Model Rules also rejected the use of the
"appearance of impropriety" standard because it would allow disqualification to turn on a client's subjective anxiety over her attorney's representation of another client.'6
In addition, since
"impropriety" itself is undefined, "appearance of impropriety" is
question-begging. Nevertheless, many courts have used "appearance
of impropriety" as an independent ground for disqualifying counsel,
and even today a few states retain it as part of their professional
codes. 67 Even state courts that follow the Model Rules may
occasion'
ally refer to the Model Code in rendering their decisions. 6
For example, in New Jersey, which has retained the "appearance
of impropriety" standard as part of its Rules of Professional Conduct,
the Federal District Court in Millburn MarketingAssoc. v. ParkerLaboratories, Inc. 6 disqualified an attorney who was seeking to represent a
client on a matter substantially related to a prior matter handled by

suggesting changes to the rules of professional conduct. They have been particularly active in restricting competition through restrictions on advertising and
through the creation of unauthorized practice barriers. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHics 34-36, 50, 60-63 (1986) (noting more variation from state to
state in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct than there had been with respect
to the earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
164 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBIUTY Canon 9, ECs 9-1, 9-2 (1983).
16 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
75-342
(1975).
1
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.9, cmt. 5 (1996).
167 See N.J. RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9; Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 109 N.J. 201, 211, 536 A.2d 243, 248 (1988) ("The 'appearance' doctrine is intended not to prevent any actual conflicts of interest but to bolster the
public's confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.").
16
See First American Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Ark.
1990); see also GILLERS, supranote 6, at 302-03.
1W Civ. No. 93-3540, 1994 WL 228531 (D.NJ. May 17, 1994).
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the attorney. ' 7 In so doing, the court relied on the need to protect
the former client whose confidences might be compromised.'' The
court also used the substantial relationship test, which allows courts
to enforce the duty of confidentiality without actually inquiring into
the confidences themselves.'2 This process protects the client in the
case in question and also gives other future clients confidence that
what they say will not be used against them by their attorneys in the
future. Although the court stated that the substantial relationship
test is important to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the
bar,' " the court's justification was not to protect the image of lawyers
generally, but to protect clients from attorneys who might breach
confidences in circumstances where neither the client nor the court
system would otherwise be able to protect the client.
Similarly, in Simms v. Exeter ArchitecturalProducts, Inc., 7 the plaintiff, a founding shareholder and director of a corporation, consulted
and shared confidences with an attorney in a closely held corporation. 7 5 The plaintiff subsequently sought to disqualify the defendant
corporation's attorney who had drafted and who was trying to enforce the shareholder agreement. 7 6 The attorney also owned shares
in the corporation. The court, in disqualifying the attorney and his
firm, relied on the "appearance of impropriety" standard and the
need to preserve public confidence in the legal system in order to
protect the plaintiff and those similarly situated who might reasonably believe that they were represented by the attorney.1 " As in Millburn Marketing, the court was not protecting the image of lawyers
See id. at *7.
See id. at *3-4.
17
See id,, at *3 (citing Judge Weinfeld's opinion in T.C. Theatre Corp.
v. Warner
Brothers Pictures,Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)). The court said:
The former client need show no more than that the matters embraced
170
1

within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf
of his adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action wherein the attorney previously represented him, the former cli-

ent. The court will assume that during the course of the former representation confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the
subject matter of the representation. It will not inquire into their na-

ture and extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer's duty of absolute
fidelity be enforced and the spirit of the rule relating to privileged
communications be maintained.
Id.
17

174
175

176

"

See id.

868 F. Supp. 668 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
See id. at 675-77.
See id. at 675.
See id. at 677.
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generally. Rather, it was seeking to protect the plaintiff and clients
like him who may reasonably believe they were forming an attorneyclient relationship and whose confidence in their own particular attorney could be impaired by allowing a corporation to retain that attorney. The court recognized that such a situation is particularly
problematic when the attorney has a personal financial stake that
puts him at odds with other shareholders such as the plaintiff.
Finally, in many conflict of interest cases, courts are seeking to
protect clients -

current and future

-

so that the confidence they

have in their attorneys will not be impaired by questionable attorney
conduct. The courts in cases like Millburn Marketingand Simms were
correct in concluding that there is a strong public interest in ensuring individuals that their confidences will be held inviolate by their
attorneys. There also appears to be a stronger correlation between
how the public might behave if it believed that attorneys were
breaching their confidences and how the public behaves when it
views "undignified" attorney advertising or solicitations. For example, street smart criminals who realize that a confession to their
counsel will make it unethical for their attorney to allow them to testify falsely at trial will simply refuse to tell their attorneys the truth in
the first place.'78 On the other hand, there is no proof that clients
whose attorneys advertise or who distribute mail solicitations have
less confidence in their attorneys than do clients of attorneys who do
not advertise. It is even more of a stretch to say that clients whose attorneys do not advertise will lose confidence in their counsel because
of other attorneys who do advertise.

178 See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice,
and the
"Search for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1298-99 (1996); Teresa
Stanton Collett, UnderstandingFreedman's Ethics, 33 ARiz. L. REV. 455, 464 (1991).
Some attorneys seem to follow the ethically dubious practice of refusing to ask their
clients what happened so as to avoid acquiring information that will preclude them
from putting the client on the stand. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 n.9 (1987) (stating that this conduct is unethical).

However, Professor Monroe Freedman has argued that attorneys can and perhaps
should accomplish the same result by warning their clients (Mirandizing them) that
what they say will be held in confidence but that if they confess, the attorney will not

be able to allow them to testify falsely. See FREEDMAN, supranote 78, at 130. Professor Freedman has argued that Model Rule 1.2(e) requires such a warning. Id. Dean
Norman Lefstein has also argued that Rule 1.2 conflicts with the ABA Standards. See
Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in CriminalCases: Still in Search of an Answer, 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 521, 536 (1988). Model Rule 1.2(e) provides: "When a lawyer knows
that a client expects assistance not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or
other law, the lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations
on the lawyer's conduct." MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(e).
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Unlike attorney advertising, there is less need to rely on maintaining the image of the bar to justify the regulation of conflicts of
interest. There is an independent reason for disqualifying attorneys
who may potentially breach confidences: protecting the confidences
of the former client. It is instructive that under the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct the former client has an absolute right to permit the subsequent representation.'7 This suggests that the public
interest in maintaining confidences only exists to the extent that it
parallels the client's interest.
On the other hand, in the context of concurrent conflicts of interest, one client may not always be able to waive his attorney's conflict of interest.1m Some courts have used the need to assure the public of the integrity of the process as a justification for refusing to
permit waiver."" However, when the client reasonablyinsists on retaining conflicted counsel where counsel has been able fully to inform
him of the conflict, public confidence in the verdict is not enhanced

179

See MODEL RULFS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt.12.

Interestingly,

under the New Jersey version of the Model Rules there is no absolute right to waive
even successive conflicts of interest. See Steel v. General Motors Corp., 912 F. Supp.
724, 740 (D.N.J. 1995) (construing New Jersey R.P.C. 1.9 (b)). The Steel court
stated:
The impropriety of taking a case against a former client is not based
solely on necessity for disclosure of confidential communications. If
the former client has any reason to feel aggrieved, the necessity of
maintaining proper public relations for the bar and of avoiding the
appearance of wrongdoing should cause the attorney to refuse to accept employment in a capacity adverse to the interests of a former client.
Id. at 741 (quoting In re Cipriano, 68 N.J. 398, 403, 346 A.2d 393, 395 (1975)).
180 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7 (b) (1996)
(permitting waiver if a reasonable attorney believes the representation will not adversely affect the representation of the other client, and each client consents after
consultation), with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUIY Canon 9 (1983)
(having been interpreted by courts in some situations as not permitting an accused
to waive his counsel's conflict). See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 146
(5th Cir. 1983). DR 5-105(c) of the old Model Code permitted client waiver of the
conflict if it was obvious that the lawyer could adequately represent multiple clients
and if each client consented after full disclosure. The Snyder court's interpretation
of Canon 9 would allow the public interest to trump the rights of the client, though
it seems unlikely that there would be many cases in which the waiver requirements
for DR 5-105(c) would be satisfied and an appearance of impropriety would be created. See id.
1s1 See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 161 (1986); United
States v.
Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982) ("[T]he right
to counsel of choice is not absolute.., and must give way where its vindication
would create a serious risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our
legal system.").
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by depriving an accused of counsel of his choice.'
Particularly in
criminal cases in which the right to counsel attaches, there is a strong
presumption in favor of permitting counsel of one's choice. 8 This
further suggests that the public interest in the image of the lawyers is
less significant.
In addition, in the concurrent conflict of interest context there
is also an independent reason for disqualifying counsel - protecting
the interest of the client who is misinformed or naive about the dangers posed by the conflict of interest. Courts that have sustained the
denial of an accused's right to retain conflicted counsel have sometimes based their decisions on the need to preserve the public's confidence in the judicial system as set forth in Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 84 In most cases, these courts could have
reached the same result by relying on the need to protect the client
from being hung out to dry by seriously conflicted counsel.'86
For example, defense counsel in United States v. Snyder,6 in order properly to defend his client, would have had to question the defendant's state court testimony and, in the process, would have had
to inculpate himself 8 7 No rational defendant would retain such seriously conflicted counsel unless his goal were to create an issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. Courts that have denied
defendants the right to counsel of their choice have often been concerned about such tactical decisions. 8 Although courts may say they
See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64 (sustaining the prosecution's objection to
defense counsel where defense counsel had previously defeated the government
prosecutor by securing the acquittal of one of defendant's co-conspirators); see also
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.7 (1998) (rejecting the use of any
appearance of impropriety test and instead focusing on whether the attorney can
reasonably represent the interest of both parties).
185 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154.
184 See Hobson, 672 F.2d at 828.
But see Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847
F.2d 725, 729 n.6 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting in dicta that the Canon 9 test for appearance of impropriety should not be used as a basis for disqualification in jurisdictions
that no longer follow the Model Code).
8
See United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 1993). Where defense
counsel was implicated in heroin trafficking, which related to the charge on which
defendant was being tried, counsel had a non-waivable conflict of interest. See id.
The court based its decision on the need both to protect the defendant and to assure the integrity of the legal proceeding. See id. at 612. The court stated: "Advice
as well as advocacy is permeated by counsel's self-interest, and no rational defendant
would knowingly and intelligently be represented by a lawyer whose conduct was
guided largely by a desire for self-preservation." Id. at 613.
707 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1983).
187
See id. at 146.
198 See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161. The Court cautioned:
182

[T]rial courts confronted with multiple representations face the pros-
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are avoiding the public perception of conflict," what they may actually be doing is creating a prophylactic rule to protect clients in situations in which there is no better way to protect them from conflicted
counsel and at the same time to save the court system the time and
expense of having to retry people.
Similarly, in United States v. Urbana,'" the court disqualified an
attorney who was implicated in the very conspiracy with which his client was charged."' Although the court relied on the need to preserve public confidence in the judicial system, the court noted that it
also had ample justification for disqualifying counsel in order to prowitness.'9 2
tect the client from having counsel who would likely be a
The court was concerned that counsel had such a strong incentive to
exculpate himself and thereby inculpate his client that client's waiver
should not be given effect.'" A court may also decide not to respect a
client's choice of counsel where there is a serious question as to
whether the attorney has been able to make full disclosure to one client because of his duty of confidentiality to another client."
Many courts deny standing to anyone other than clients to raise
concurrent conflict of interest objections. 5 Other courts allow nonclients to raise objection, but only if they can show that the conflict
prejudiced their individual rights.'6 Still others permit a non-client
standing if the conflict "greatly implicates public interest," but never-

pect of being "whip-sawed" by assertions of error no matter which way
they rule. If a district court agrees to the multiple representation, and
the advocacy of counsel is thereafter impaired as a result, the defendant may well claim that he did not receive effective assistance. On
the other hand, a district court's refusal to accede to the multiple representation may result in a challenge such as petitioner's in this case.
Nor does a waiver by the defendant necessarily solve the problem, for

we note, without passing judgment on, the apparent willingness of
Courts of Appeals to entertain ineffective assistance claims from defendants who have specifically waived the right to conflict-free counsel.
Id.; see also United States v. Levine, 794 F.2d 1203, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1986).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Harmon, 914 F. Supp. 275, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
190

770 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991).

191

See id. at 1558.

192

See id.

See id.; see also MODEL RULES

OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1996); United
1093
(5th Cir), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980).
States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092,
193

194 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 cmt. 5 (1997).

195 See, e.g., In reYarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 530 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir.
1976). But see Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 835 (1st Cir. 1987) (nonclients have standing because of the court's need to know if attorneys are violating
ethical rules). See also GILLERS, supra note 6, at 261-62.
'9 See, e.g., In reInfotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990).
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theless allow the client to waive the conflict. 97 Courts that limit
standing in these fashions have implicitly concluded that a client's interest in obtaining counsel of choice outweighs any societal interest
in maintaining the image of the bar.
In sum, courts that have denied clients the counsel of their
choice because of the need to preserve confidence in the legal system
or in attorneys could have based their decision, in almost all cases, on
the need to protect one of the attorney's clients. When that justification is not present, denying a client counsel of choice may actually
undermine confidence in the legal system. Moreover, that courts
frequently deny standing to assert a conflict to parties who cannot
show they have been harmed by the conflict suggests that preserving
confidence in the judicial system and protecting the image of the bar
are often makeweights.
C. Attorneys'Fees
Courts have often used the need to protect the public perception of lawyers as ajustification for refusing to approve attorneys' fees
or for reducing them in cases involving fee-shifting statutes. By disallowing or reducing attorney fees, judges are primarily protecting one
party from being gouged, either by his own lawyer or by the opposing
party's lawyer (in cases involving fee shifting). There really is little to
worry about how such fee shifting would impact the general public's
view of lawyers.
First, the general public already thinks that lawyers often gouge

their clients.' Whether judges reduce or eliminate fees in a few selected cases will hardly make a difference. Second, it does not matter
whether the public thinks that lawyers in general overcharge. What
matters is how that opinion might impact people's conduct. As long
as clients are happy with their own attorneys, and as long as clients do
not refuse to retain counsel because of the belief that all lawyers
overcharge, there is no reason to worry about how fees affect the
public's view of lawyers. 99 Put another way, it seems unlikely that
197 See

Chapman Eng'rs, Inc. v. Natural Gas Sales Co., 766 F. Supp. 949, 955 (D.

Kan. 1991); GILLERS, supra note 6, at 262.
19
See Starnes v. Hill, 589 F. Supp. 341, 347-48 (W.D.N.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part,Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1986).
19 In In re Oracle Securities Litigation, when awarding attorney's fees in a class ac-

tion, the court stated that whether the attorneys' representation was "fair and adequate" should be judged by reference to the members of the class and not to the
public's perception of the fees:
One distinguished jurist went so far as to warn of the grave danger that
the bench and bar will be brought into disrepute absent a lodestar ap-

1446

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1405

members of the public could legitimately complain about the size of
legal fees in a given case if the parties to the case were satisfied. If
they were to complain, that might suggest that unrelated historical,
social, or cultural factors might be the root cause of the complaint.m
Some courts have cited concern about avoiding legislative regulation of lawyers as a reason for courts to control legal fees. Especially given the number of lawyers who are in legislatures, 0' it seems
unlikely that either Congress or state legislatures would attempt a
general overhaul of lawyers' fees.0 Of course, there have been some
limits imposed on lawyer fees, such as in the area of medical malpractice.
At any rate, if lawyers seek to overcharge their clients or the
opposing party, those parties can bring their cases to court for protection. 4 If courts fail to protect clients and opposing parties from
overcharges, then legislative intervention may be appropriate.
proach. But the interests of the class should be foremost, not concern
for the reputation of the bench and bar. Experience over the last
quarter century, in any event, demonstrates that the lodestar is a
source of, not savior from such disrepute.
131 F.R.D. 688, 691 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108
F.R.D. 237 (3d Cir. Task Force 1985)) (other citations omitted).
200 See supra text accompanying
notes 73-103.
201 There are 55 lawyers in the Senate. Biographies
of Senate Members, [1997-1998] 1
Cong. Index 10,501-13 (Mar. 14, 1997). In the House, 172 of the 435 members are
lawyers, compared to 222 in 1977 and 247 in 1965. See Norman Jane, Lots of Lawyers
on CongressionalBallots, DES MOINES REG., May 10, 1998, at 5.
This institutional bias toward lawyers may partially explain why states
have negotiated rather generous contingency fee agreements with lawyers suing tobacco
companies for the costs incurred by these states in treating tobacco-related illnesses.
These fees range from 10% to 25% of the total recovery. See Cary Spivak, Tobacco
Suit a Boon for Lawyers. State's Contract Lacks Cap on Attorney Fees, MILWAuKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 28, 1997, at 1. Lawyers in other state tobacco cases are reaping huge
attorneys' fees. In Florida, attorneys' fees and court costs were $49 million of a $350
million settlement. See Attendants Settle Tobacco Suit, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 11, 1997, at 1.
However, in another Florida case, Florida retained outside lawyers on a 25% contingency fee basis to sue tobacco companies for the Medicaid costs the State incurred
in treating smoking related illnesses. See Stephen Gillers, FloridaBacks Out On a Dea
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al. The State reached a $1.3 billion settlement with the
tobacco industry. See id. In the settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay
.reasonable attorneys' fees, to be determined by a panel of independent arbitrators." Id. Florida then renounced its deal with the lawyers. See id.
Before the tobacco legislation was killed in the Senate, the Senate approved a
$500 per hour cap on attorneys' fees after previously voting down a $250 per hour
limit on lawyers' fees for the lawyers whose class actions and lawsuits forced the tobacco industry to the bargaining table. See Myron Levin, Cap on Anti-Tobacco Attorney
Fees Killed Senate: GOP Conservatives Seek $250-an-hourLimit for Lawyers Behind Industry
Settlement, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1998, at Al6; AlissaJ. Rubin & Myron Levin, Senate Sets
Cap on Feesfor Attorneys in Tobacco Suits Legislation, L.. TIMES,June 17, 1998, at A17.
203 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1114 (West 1998).
204
In Eich v. Gregory A. Maceau, P.C., No. 96 CA1354 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 28,
1997)

(unpublished opinion), summarized in, 14 LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L
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Another problem with applying a standard based on lawyer image is that it is inherently vague. This problem is magnified in the
attorney fee context where there are rather clear objective standards
for determining the appropriate size of a fee, such as what other similar firms charge for similar types of work, the experience of the attorney, and the difficulty of the work. 5 A test based on protecting
the lawyers' image is so vague that it can be used to support opposing
arguments. For example, some have sought to restrict lawyer adverCONDUCr 20 (ABA/BNA) (Feb. 4, 1998), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed a
jury decision denying a lawyer any recovery under a contingency fee agreement despite the lawyer's successful representation of the client. See id.The lawyer had assisted a client in recovering $100,000 under an automobile uninsured motorist policy. See id. The insured had incurred more than $70,000 of medical expenses at the
time that the attorney made demand on the insurance company, and the insurance
company paid the full amount of the policy. See id. The attorney sought recovery of
his one-third contingency fee, and the jury determined that the attorney did not
prove the reasonableness of his fee. See id. They further determined that the value
of the lawyer's services was zero. See id.
205 Model Rule 1.5 sets forth the following factors
as relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a fee:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1997); see also Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). Johnson set
forth the following 11 factors for courts to consider in determining the size of legal
fees to be awarded to a prevailing party (plaintiff) for prevailing in a civil rights
claim:
(1) The time and labor required ....
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions ....
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly ....
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case ....
(5) The customary fee ....
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent ....
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
(10) The "undesirability" of the case ....
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
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rising in order to protect the public's image of the bar. Still others
who believe that lawyers' excessive fees might hurt the image of the
legal profession could plausibly argue that lawyer advertising is necessary in order to reduce the cost of legal services.0 9
In cases involving federal statutory fee awards, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to tamper with the lodestar formula be-7
cause of concern about creating burdensome satellite litigation. N
Use of an image test could only exacerbate the problem of satellite
litigation. Because of the vagueness of the standard, courts also
backed away from using the "appearance of impropriety" standard in
analyzing conflicts of interest even before the ABA Code was modified to eliminate the test."0 8 For the same reasons, courts should
avoid relying on the nebulous objective of protecting the image of
lawyers when judging the reasonableness of attorney fees.
D. Cameras in the Courtroom
All sorts of arguments have been advanced to justify banning
cameras from the courtroom. For example, New York has recently
refused to renew its experimental use of cameras in its courts amid
fierce lobbying from defense lawyers and victims' rights groups.2W
Some courts have barred cameras in order to protect the privacy of
jurors, witnesses, and victims, particularly where minors have been
involved, and to try to cut down on the sensationalism cameras are
said to instigate.1 ° In the wake of the o.J. Simpson trial, cameras
have been barred because of concern that their presence would
21
cause lawyers to misbehave and might affect how witnesses testify. 1

See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1977).
See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992) (refusing to enhance
attorney fee award beyond lodestar amount to reflect the fact that prevailing party's
attorneys were retained on a contingent-fee basis).
M
See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (appearance
of impropriety is "too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order, except
in the rarest of cases"); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir.
1977) (labeling the standard an "eye of the beholder test"), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978).
M See Cameras in the Courts,N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 1997, at A2; James Dao, Agreement
Looks Doubtful on Courtroom Camera Bill N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1997, at B5.
210
See Dao, supra note 209; Alexandra Marks, Witness Impact Rules TV Out of Federal
Courts, CHRISTAN So. MONITOR, Sept. 19, 1995, at 10; Tim O'Brien, High Court 7V
N.Y. TIME, Jan. 6, 1997, at Al7.
21
See Angelique M. Paul, Turning the Camera on Court TV: Does Televising Trials
Teach Us Anything About the Real Law?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 677-83 (1997); Walter
Goodman, Court TV: Case of the Curious Witness, N.Y. TIMEsJuly 21, 1997, at C15.
206

207
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Don Hewitt, the creator and executive producer of the top-rated
news magazine show 60 Minutes, has also suggested that cameras
should be barred from the courtroom because they cause the public
to have a bad perception of lawyers." If cameras in the courtroom
cause lawyers or witnesses to behave differently than they otherwise
would, and that behavior is thought to be problematic, that would
justify restricting or banning cameras from the courtroom.
On the other hand, if cameras actually reflect what is typically
occurring in the courtroom, they should not be barred to preserve
the incorrect beliefs that people may hold. To the contrary, the goal
should be to correct the problems that the camera exposes.
For
example, if lawyers typically delay trials or judges adjourn court in
the middle of the afternoon, and cameras reveal these facts, needed
changes can be made to the legal system. Removing cameras to preserve the public image of lawyers and the legal system may simply
mask the real problems that are present."
Cameras may not only reveal problems, but may make judges,
lawyers, and other court officials more accountable for their behavior.21 5 For example, a judge in North Carolina ordered a public de-

fender out of a courtroom for appearing at a death-sentence hearing
in shorts, a T-shirt and tennis shoes.1 6 It seems unlikely that the attorney would have dressed that way if he knew the hearing was being
televised. Cameras also allow voters the opportunity to check on
whether elected judges are as tough on crime as they promised in
their campaigns.1
Others have argued that cameras in the courtroom could, in
fact, actually help attorneys' image by restoring confidence in the le212
213

See Hewitt, supra note 4, at Al.
See Raymond Hernandez, Albany Debates Law on Cameras in Court, N.Y. TIMES,

July 7, 1997, at B 1; The Simpson Legacy/Trial & Error: Focus Shifts to a Justice System and
Its Flaws, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at Part-S.
214 See David A. Harris, The Appearance ofJustice: Court TV, Conventional Television,
and Public Understandingof the CriminalJustice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 785, 790-91
(1993) ("[I]f people think that the criminal justice system works well and fairly when

it does not, they may fail to recognize the need for critically important changes or
reform.").
2
SeePaul, supra note 211, at 676.
26 See Brant Clifton, The Talk[ers] of the Town
Lumberton, N.C., U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at 17.
217 See Harris, supra note 214, at 789-90. Some might
argue that this would have
the effect of making judges too accountable, thereby compromising judicial inde-

pendence. The remedy for this problem, however, may be to appoint judges and
give them life tenure. If the state system provides for election of judges, it should
give the voters sufficient information from which they can make an informed decision. See Gross, supra note 110, at 1187.
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gal system 8 and clearing up the so called "pop culture image" of attorneys.2 9 A 1994 Times Mirror Center national survey found that
regular viewing of court trial proceedings may lead to a greater appreciation of the U.S. court system.!" This survey found that "a significant plurality of Americans who have watched trials on Court TV
have come away having much more respect for, and confidence in,
their legal system."22' In truth, it is easy for both advocates and opponents of cameras in the courtroom plausibly to argue that television exposure of lawyers in the courtroom enhances or detracts from
lawyers' image. This paradox should give serious pause in relying on
the image criterion in determining whether cameras should be allowed in the courtroom.
E.

Creationof a Cause of Action

Courts will sometimes imply or refuse to imply a cause of action
because of concern for the public's respect for the bar or for the judiciary. Usually, safeguarding the image of lawyers or the judiciary is
a makeweight. For example, in Aronson v. United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development,2n the Court of Appeals held that attorney fees should not be awarded to a pro se lawyer who successfully
brought an action under the Freedom of Information Act.2m The
court's decision was primarily based on its conclusion that selfrepresentation did not serve the goals of the Freedom of Information
Act because it encouraged litigation by lawyers whose judgment and
objectivity may be colored by their personal stake in the litigation.
The court added that the Freedom of Information Act's purposes
were not advanced by awarding fees to a litigant for a non-performed
service.2m An attorney who represents himself is not performing a
service for his client. Allowing him recovery would produce a windfall. Therefore, according to the court, he should not be treated any
differently than a layman proceeding pro se who is precluded from
recovering for his own time.6
218

See Steven Brill, Courtroom Cameras, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1181, 1182, 1187

(1997).
219 See Paul, supra note 211, at 655-57.
220 See Cassandra Burrell, TV Trials Draw Bid Audiences, AP,Feb. 4, 1994, available
in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 10132483.
2'
Brill, supra note 218, at 1187.
866 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
222
224
225

See id. at 6.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id. at 5.
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As an additional reason for refusing to treat lawyers differently
than laymen, the court noted that it did not want to "appear to be especially solicitous for the economic welfare of lawyers. This is not the
type of image that enhances public respect for the bar orjudiciary."2"
The court's decision would seemingly have to have been premised on
whether an award of fees served the purpose of the Freedom of Information Act because, as the court observed, other circuits have
awarded attorneys' fees to successful litigants under The Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.2 Since the
court did not suggest that those decisions were in error, the implication is that courts can use the need to protect the image of the bar to
reach any result they want. For example, one could argue that the
image of the bar is enhanced by pro se lawyers bringing successful
civil rights actions even if they are rewarded for their services. Similarly, one could argue that uncovering valuable documents or establishing valuable precedents under the Freedom of Information Act
also could be in the public interest and thereby could enhance the
public's image of lawyers.
& 2 demonstrates
The case of Wieder v. Skala
how slippery application of the concept can be. In Wieder, plaintiff argued that a cause of
action should be implied for lawyers who have been dismissed for fulfilling their ethical obligation to report or to get their law firms to
report the unethical conduct of a member of the firm.2 30 At oral argument, ChiefJudge Sol Wachtler23 ' asked plaintiff's lawyer, David C.
Vladek, what the "public perception kick" would be if the court were
to imply a cause of action in favor of lawyers when it had refused to
create an implied cause of action for other professionals who had
been dismissed for reporting improper conduct of their employers. "
Id. at 6.
See Aronson, 866 F.2d at 5 (citing Duncan v. Poythress, 777 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir.
1985); Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980)).
229
609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
230
See id. at 109.
227
228

231

Ironically, at the time this case was argued Chief Judge Wachtler was attempt-

ing to blackmail his former girlfriend by threatening to kidnap her daughter. See
Associated Press, "Lovesickness," Not Drugs, Caused Wachtler's Bizarre Behavior, Psychia-

trist Claims, Aug. 10, 1993, at AS; William Bunch & Jim Mulvaney, Wachtler's Pleads
Guilty to 1 Count, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1, 1993, at 5; Ex-Chief Judge of New York Plea Bargains
in Stalking ofEx-Lover, AP,Mar. 31, 1993, availablein WESTLAW, 1993 WL 4534307.

The full text of the colloquy between Chief Judge Wachtler and attorney
Vladek is as follows:
ChiefJudge Wachtler:
Do you think it could have an adverse effect on the public's perception
232

concerning the profession and the integrity of the profession because
it would look as though the court had said with respect to one public
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Mr. Vladek asked rhetorically what would be the public perception
kick of failing to imply a cause of action in favor of lawyers and
thereby signaling to the public that the court placed a rather low
value on its own reporting requirement.2 In the end, the court created an implied cause of action in favor of Wieder, but did so without
relying
25L4 on the need to preserve the image of the bar or the judiciary.
Instead, the court held that there is an implied contract between the law firm and the associate that the law firm will not interfere with the associate's ethical obligations as codified in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. m The court also relied on the need to
avoid placing associates on the horns of a dilemma as to whether to
comply with their ethical obligations or to protect theirjobs.
In sum, courts should be leery about using the image of the bar
as a reason to imply or not to imply a cause of action because (1)
there generally will be better reasons to imply or not to imply a cause
of action, and (2) such a standard may produce rather subjective results since what advances the lawyer's image is in the eye of the beholder.2
Sanctionsfor MisbehavingAttorneys

F.

Courts occasionally cite the need to protect the public's image
of lawyers as a makeweight in determining the appropriate sanction
in disciplinary cases. 7 This approach is misguided for several reapolicy, at will employment, one set of rules applies to society. With respect to our profession, we take care of our own and we have a special
extra protection here. What would [be] the perception kick, if you
will - the practical consequence - of that interpretation?
David Vladek, attorney for plaintiff, Wieder:
I would like to answer that question in two ways. The first is... I'd like
to turn that around. The question is what is the perception of the
public on reading the lower court's opinion that shows that the reporting value in New York is treated with indifference by the court .... I
think it is a very powerful problem that the message the court sends to
the public [is] we do not care enough about reporting to protect the
messenger.
Videotape: Oral argument in Wieder v. Skala, No. 256, (N.Y. Oct. 21, 1992) (on file
with the author).
2W

Seeid.

See Weider, 609 N.E.2d at 108.
See id.
23 Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., concurring)
(finding that a movie was not obscene, Justice Stewart stated that he would not attempt to define what constitutes hard core pornography not protected by the First
Amendment, "But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that.").
237 See Virgin Islands Bar Ass'n v. Lehtonen, Nos. 1980/119, 1987/410,
1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18450 (D.V.I. Dec. 27, 1988). The court reasoned:
2N
3
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sons. First, according to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, the primary purpose of the disciplinary process should be
"to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers
who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession." 2 a To the extent that the focus shifts
to determining how the public views the offense and the offender,
sanctions may be produced that are inconsistent with each other and
that fail to fulfill the primary objective of sanctions.
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions mention in
the commentary to section 5.0, regarding violations of duties owed to
the public, the need to preserve public confidence in the officers of
the court. 39 However, there appears to be no strong correlation between the extent to which a profession polices itself and the public's
perception of the profession. The police have recently come under
strong criticism for failure to monitor abuse and for the code of silence that shields from discipline the minority of officers who commit abuse.2 40 Nevertheless, the public still views police more favorably
than it does lawyers.2 4 ' The public's view of particular professions

seems more likely related to the nature of the profession than to the
number of complaints that are made and how the profession handles
them .
The public identifies us as negligent, uncaring, greedy, and interested
only in ourselves. Of course this does not apply to all attorneys. However, the actions of the few have affected the perception the public has
of all of us.
This Court cannot, at such a time, return to the practice of law
anyone who has so betrayed that trust and added to the harm the entire profession suffers in the mind's eye of the people of the territory.
Id.

ABA, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § 1.1 (1992), reprinted in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCT § 01:807 (1992).
239 See id. § 5.0, reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUcT,
supra
note 238, at § 01:826. The standards provide: "[T]he public expects the lawyer to
be honest and to abide by the law; public confidence in the integrity of officers of
the court is undermined when lawyers engage in illegal conduct." ld.
240 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
POLICE BRUTALITY AND
2M

IN THE UNITED STATES (June 1998) (available at http://www.
hrw.org/hrw/reports98/police/index.htm).
24 See Doctors, Scientists Enjoy Public's Highest Favor, Harris Poll Says, supra note 56
(41% of respondents regarded police officers as having very great prestige while
only 23% gave lawyers that rating).
242 The number of citizen complaints also appears to be more
a function of the
nature of the profession's interaction with the public rather than a reflection of how
the public views the profession. This may explain why there are more complaints
against police than there are against lawyers even though the public views police
more favorably than it does lawyers.
ACCOUNTABILITY
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Certainly, public confidence in a particular lawyer will be undermined by his improper conduct.4 However, public confidence in
the integrity of the bar generally would not be undermined by failing
to discipline particular lawyers unless the public were to believe that
a large percentage of lawyers were committing unethical acts.24 In
other words, public confidence would be undermined only if the
public were to believe that it was unable to sort out the rotten apples.
Proper disciplinary measures should be determined by reference to
the sanctions necessary to deter the improper conduct and to protect
the public from such misbehavior. Using that standard should satisfy
any concern about loss of confidence in the bar without the need to
rely on any amorphous "appearance of impropriety" standard.
If protecting the image of lawyers becomes our primary objective, then lawyers whom the public perceives to be unethical should
be heavily sanctioned even if they did not actually violate any rules.

Complaints against policemen are much more common than complaints against
attorneys. In 1997 the Illinois state police investigated 6,327 cases involving complaints against police officers. Of these cases, 362 resulted in formal complaints being filed. Twenty-five percent of those cases resulted in formal discipline. See Telephone interview with Leann Davis, Division of Internal Investigation, Illinois State
Police (July 1998). There were approximately 3,000 state police officers in Illinois in
1997. See Citizens for Legal Responsibility (created Aug. 5, 1997) <http://www.
clr.org/jib.html>. In addition, according to Human Rights Watch, instances of police abuse, particularly in large cities, constitute a serious human rights violation. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 240.
By comparison, in 1997 in Illinois, there were 6,293 investigations involving
charges against 4,173 different attorneys. Formal complaints were filed in 121 cases,
resulting in discipline in 117 cases against 116 different attorneys. The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission reported that there were 70,415
active attorneys in 1997. See ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM'N OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 1997, 4-5, 9, 11 (1998).
243 See In re Rohan, 578 P.2d 102, 106 (Cal. 1978).
The court announced:
It is manifest that particular violations of the law by an attorney, even
certain violations for willful failures to file income tax returns, may not
warrant the imposition of discipline for an oath violation. Discipline is
warranted, however, in such instances when the violation demeans the
integrity of the legal profession and constitutes a breach of the attorney's responsibility to society.
Id.
24
Cf id, at 106-07 (Tobriner, C.J. concurring). Judge Tobriner admonished:
The requirement of a specific nexus between the attorney's conduct
and the practice of law should not be evaded by assertions that such
conduct demeans the integrity of the legal profession or constitutes an
example which may encourage others to violate the law. Such assertions merely concoct a method by which a transgression unrelated to
legal practice can be magnified by unproven and hypothetical conjectures as to its effect upon the opinions of others.
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Such a policy would obviously raise serious due process problems.
Because of concerns about its vagueness, the ABA has rejected the
appearance of impropriety standard in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.246 The profession should not condone its use
through the back door and reject its use through the front door. Using such a vague standard would permit individuals who committed
similar offenses to be treated differently. What is worse, such individuals could be treated differently based on political considerations
wholly unrelated to considerations of deterrence or protection of the
public.4 7
It has been suggested that the public lacks confidence in disciplinary procedures that permit lawyers to discipline themselves. It
has also been argued that the public believes that politically connected lawyers can obtain more lenient treatment.2 4 Despite the fact
that the process is subject to judicial regulation, the public is not reassured because it believes that judges, who are lawyers themselves,
are inherently biased in favor of lawyers. 4 9 One commentator has
even argued that an external system of discipline is necessary to improve public confidence in the bar generally.2 5 If the current system
does not do an adequate job of punishing misbehaving lawyers and
25 Cf John F. Sutton, Jr. How Vulnerable is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?,
57
N.C. L. REv. 497, 502 n.13 (1979); Donald T. Weckstein, Maintainingthe Integrity and
Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275-76 (1970); Martha E. Johnson, Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L.
REV. 671, 684-85 (1979) (criticizing the rule against engaging in conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice on the grounds that it is too broad and too vague).
However, most courts have upheld these provisions against constitutional attacks on
the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. See, e.g., In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126
n.7 (D.C. 1977); In reN.P., 361 N.W. 2d 386 (Minn. 1985); In re Rook, 556 P.2d 1351
(Or. 1976); State v. Nelson, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (Kan. 1972); Howell v. State, 559
S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The District of Columbia Bar Association subse-

quently determined that Rule 8.4 was vague.

See DISTRIcT OF COLUMBIA BAR As-

SOCIATION Opinion 119 (March 15, 1983), reprinted in Ethics Opinions [1980-1985
Transfer Binder] ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUCr § 801:2307. The
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct omitted Rule 8.4(d) of the ABA Rule because
it was too vague. See ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 8.4, (cited in
ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROF'L CONDUcT, supra note 238, at § 101:502).

See supra text accompanying notes 164-197.
For similar reasons, Professor Deborah Rhode has persuasively argued against
the way in which the bar has attempted to regulate admission to the practice of law
through the use of a moral character requirement. See generally Rhode, supra note 9.
248 See Paula A. Monopoli, Legal Ethics & Practical Politics: Musings on the Public
Per~cption of Lawyer Discipline, 10 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 423, 425 (1997).
2

247

See id. at 423.

See Russell G. Pearce, The ProfessionalismParadigm Ship: Why DiscardingProfessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1229 (1995).
250
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deterring lawyer misconduct, that certainly is a legitimate basis for altering the system. On the other hand, there is no particular reason
to change the disciplinary system to improve the image of the profession generally. First, there is no necessary connection between public dissatisfaction with the disciplinary system and the image of the
profession. Second, even if there were, a change in the disciplinary
system would only be justified by showing that loss of confidence in
the disciplinary system would deter people from retaining counsel or
cause them to lose confidence in their own attorney.
Similar problems arise in the context of bar admission. Courts
have relied on the need to protect the public image of the bar to
deny admission based on applicants' past transgressions.m ' Use of
this criterion invites discrimination and disparate treatment of people who have committed similar offenses. As with lawyer advertising,
regulating bar admission on the basis of so subjective a criterion as
the effect on the image of the profession is problematic. Practicing
lawyers can too easily manipulate this factor to promote their own interests by controlling entry to the bar.
G. JudicialMisconduct
Canon 2 of The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires
that a judge avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all professional or private activities. 52 The Commentary accompanying Canon 2 states that the rule is intended to avoid erosion of public
confidence in the judiciary that might be caused by irresponsible or
improper behavior by judges.5 3 Preserving public confidence in the
judiciary is certainly a laudable goal. For example, judges' attempts
251 See In reWiddison, 539 N.W.2d 671, 679 (S.D. 1995). The court insisted:

Public confidence that the legal profession, under the supervision
of this Court, can keep its affairs in order must be zealously maintained." The same zeal to protect the public from the unfit within the
bar must also be applied to the unfit who would seek to enter the bar.
With these great responsibilities to protect the public and ensure
the ethics and professionalism of the bar in this State which it serves,
we cannot accept the view placed in the record by a Law School faculty
member in support of Widdison that this was merely a case of
"senioritis." The failure to act in accordance with the rules is compounded by the failure to accept responsibility for these acts. The violations here are of the most serious nature as they go to the heart of
the judicial system-the matter of personal legal ethics and trust. He
acts at his peril who treats the rules for admission to the bar with the
indifference accorded an unsolicited invitation to join a book club.
I. (citations omitted).
252 See ABA MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 2
(1990).
See id. Commentary.
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to use their office to line their own pockets, fix speeding tickets,2
and help out their friends and relatives may cause people to believe
that a particular judge may be corrupt on the bench.m
One obvious question is whether it is logical or consistent to
have a rule requiring judges to avoid the appearance of impropriety,
but to condemn such a rule as applied to lawyers. Such a rule is both
logical and consistent. First, preserving confidence in judges is more
important than preserving confidence in lawyers. Second, judges
play a more important part in the judicial system.
To conclude that protection of public confidence in judges is
more important than protection of public confidence in lawyers, one
must also answer the question previously posed: How, if at all, would
people's behavior change if they lacked confidence in lawyers or
judges? Litigants who lack confidence in one attorney can find another. There is very little danger that the unacceptability of one attorney would force someone to do without needed representation. It
would be rather bizarre for a person to choose not to retain a lawyer
merely because she found another attorney's advertisements to be
distasteful. On the other hand, litigants seldom have the luxury of
selecting their own judge, though some jurisdictions do give litigants
the right
to one change of judge without the need to show any
256
cause.
Because of the inability to select a judge, there may be a
greater likelihood of individuals settling their disputes through lesspreferred channels than the courts, i.e., by force. Certainly, alternatives to court resolution of disputes, such as alternative dispute resolution, may be a reasonable option, but disputants may be less willing
to engage in ADR if there is no threat of resort to a credible court
system.
Loss of public confidence in judges could also lead to people's
unwillingness to respect court decisions. This unwillingness to respect court decisions has caused some individuals to impede en254

Chief Judge James D. Heiple of the Illinois Supreme Court was censured and

stepped down as chief judge, but escaped impeachment after a run-in with police
during a traffic stop. See Abdon M. Pallasch, Heiple Laughs, Cries and Dodges Impeach-

ment, 20 CHI. LAw., June 1997, at 1. Heiple was stopped for speeding and given a
field sobriety test in the driveway of his house. He then attempted to go inside but
was prevented from doing so. At that point, he reportedly said, "Why don't you shut
up .... Do you know who I am?" Janan Hanna, Heiple Might Sue, Face More Charges,
CHi. TRIB.,Jan. 30, 1996, at 4.
255 See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr
Canon 2A, Commentary (1990)
("The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.").
See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1001 (West 1998).
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forcement (as distinguished from legitimate means of contest such as
through elected bodies or court challenges) in areas such as school
25
integration, busing, and affirmative action.
Without public confidence in the decisions of the judiciary, it would require considerable
expense to enforce what might be perceived as non-merit-based decisions on the part of the judiciary. 2 8 Then, even if the decisions could
be enforced, dissatisfaction would be widespread.
Moreover, there are fewer checks on judicial misconduct.
Judges have so much discretion that they can avoid reversible error
while still inappropriately favoring one side or the other. The adversary system and the oversight provided by judges over lawyers limit
the amount of damage that lawyers can do. Attorneys are reluctant
to report judicial misconduct.29 In addition, it seems likely that the
state disciplinary bodies do a better job of disciplining lawyers than
they do in disciplining judges.260 Because judges play such an important role and because there are fewer checks on judicial abuse, there
is a closer nexus between judges' conduct and loss of confidence in
the judicial system than there is between lawyers' conduct and loss of
confidence in the system.
There is also a need for a prophylactic rule to deter judges from
engaging in conduct that is difficult to monitor. This situation is
analogous to cases involving conflicts of interest where there is a
strong likelihood of misbehavior that will actually harm people, coupled with an inability to determine whether such conduct will occur.
See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 48 (Cal. 1976) (discharging
a desegregation decree after 18 years of litigation because of changed conditions.
The original decree did not work because of citizen resistance, white flight, changes
in demographics, and political pressure); see also ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A.
SEBERT, JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION 526-27 (2d ed. 1989).
257

258

See In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 667 (Ct. Jud. 1978) (Simons, J., dissent-

ing); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 10.03, at 275 (1990);
RobertJ. Martineau, DiscipliningJudges for Nonofficial Conduct: A Survey and Critique of
the Law, 10 BALT. L. REV. 225, 227 (1980-81).
259 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Disciplining the FederalJudiciary: Informal Methods of
Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 243, 257-58 (1993); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring

Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of ManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAvis L.

REv. 41, 89 (1995).

See JUDICIAL INQUIRY BOARD, STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT (1996). The
Judicial
Inquiry Board of the State of Illinois reported that from 1971 through December 31,
1995, there were 3,725 files on allegations against judicial officers. See id. at 3. Only
55 of these cases resulted in formal complaints against judges with the Illinois Courts
Commission. See id. & app. D. Thirteen of those cases were dismissed by the Illinois
Supreme Court. See id. app. D. Another was dismissed though a rules violation was
found. Another was dismissed after the judge lost a retention election and was no
26

longer in office. See id. The other 40 judges received some form of discipline
(usually a reprimand) or resigned from office to avoid discipline. See id.
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Consequently, a prophylactic rule is needed to protect clients who
may be harmed by conflicts of interest and members of the public
who may be harmed by the judge's rulings. Moreover, if the judicial
system fails properly to discipline such misbehaving judges, the public may come to believe that these judges represent more than just a
few rotten apples. This, in turn, might cause an erosion in public
confidence in the judiciary.
Unlike cases involving lawyer misconduct, however, there is no
easy way to formulate a rule that will prohibit the problematic conduct without relying on the appearance of impropriety standard. 6'
In the area of lawyer misconduct, the public is derivatively harmed
when a litigant or potential future litigant is harmed. One can readily identify the types of misconduct that might harm such individuals.
There is no easy way, however, to catalog the types of matters that
might cause the public to lose confidence in the judiciary. 262 For
these reasons, despite potential vagueness concerns,6 the ABA has
retained the appearance of impropriety standard in Rule 2A of the
Code of Judicial Conduct while abandoning the standard as applied
to lawyers.
VI. CONCLUSION

A review of the historical record reveals that lawyers in America
have been hated for hundreds of years. In England, people had a
low opinion of lawyers for hundreds of years before the colonizing of
America. The public has mistrusted lawyers generally because of
jealousy, concern that lawyers were making matters as unintelligible
as possible for laymen in order to enhance their own position, association of lawyers with unpopular clients and unpopular causes, and
the perception that the wealthy get a different brand of justice than
the poor.
The legal profession should not be too quick to rely on the need
to improve the image of lawyers as a basis for legal rules such as reSee Gross, supra note 110, at 1208.
See, e.g., In reDrury, 602 N.E.2d 1000, 1006-08 (Ind. 1992) (holding that judge
violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code ofJudicial Conduct by being involved in the creation of a false letter accusing a former girlfriend, a pre-school teacher, of having
committed a felony).
263 See e.g., Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225, 1240 (D.D.C. 1977);
In re Sims
462 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1984) (finding "appearance of impropriety" standard not
unconstitutionally vague); In re Roth, 645 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Or. 1982) (finding that a
portion of Canon 2A requiringjudge to "respect and comply with the law" is not unconstitutionally vague and ignoring the "ephemeral" language in the second portion
of Canon 2A).
261
262
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strictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation. First, since the public's attitude toward lawyers is the result of a complex variety of systemic, psychological, and cultural factors, it is doubtful that any one
single legal rule will have any significant change in the public attitude. Second, one must not confuse how the public views lawyers
with how the public behaves. Members of the public may hate lawyers generally or find it fashionable to say they hate lawyers while simultaneously retaining and having confidence in their own lawyers
and in the legal system. Even when there is some connection between a particular regulation and the image of the bar, the regulation should only be based on image if the image gains to be derived
from the regulation outweigh the other costs that the regulation will
impose.
Although some legal rules may be dictated in part by the need to
maintain public confidence in the legal system, in most instances
those rules are supportable for wholly independent reasons. When
those independent bases do not exist, as, for example, in cases in
which a fully informed client has made a reasonable decision to retain conflicted counsel, public confidence in the legal system will not
be enhanced by refusing to permit a waiver in order to satisfy some
vague notion of "enhancing the image of the legal profession" or
avoiding the "appearance of impropriety." Analysis simply becomes
more confused and unpredictable when courts, to justify their decisions, rely on the need to protect the image of lawyers. Using the
subjective standard of "image" as a justification for regulation of lawyers' conduct may simply be a way to allow those in a position of
power to impose their own view of morality on others. Finally, by invoking the need to protect the public's image of lawyers to justify legal regulation, lawyers may simply be attempting surreptitiously to
advance their own economic interests.

